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Abstract 
This thesis is an attempt at explaining the shift which has been seen in the foreign policy of the 
Republic of Moldova since the Communist party came to power in 2001. After independence, 
Moldova conducted a vacillating foreign and security policy between a pro-Romanian and a pro-
Russian policy. In 2001 the Communist Party of Moldova was elected and after a short period 
where the government seemed to promote the “Russification” of the country, it radically changed 
course towards “Europeanisation”. This puzzle is the starting point for this thesis. 
  
The thesis takes its theoretical starting point from the constellation theory and the theory of the 
state, both belonging to the broader realist tradition. The constellation theory helps explaining how 
the geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration affects the external behaviour of non-pole powers by 
particularly looking at the challenges emanating from their respective salient environments. Thus, 
the analysis starts out by looking at the role of the EU/NATO institutions and continues with the 
near geopolitical environment represented by Russia, Romania and Ukraine. At the domestic level 
the theory of the state it is introduced and such elements as the idea of the state, the institutions 
and the physical base of the state are argued to have importance for the conduct in foreign affairs. 
Last but not least the constellation theory’s concept of the historical legacy is looked at in 
explaining how past geopolitics has influenced the interaction of the various actors. 
 
The thesis concludes that the Communist government has conducted a pragmatic and balanced 
foreign policy, exactly as the previous governments since independence, despite the apparent 
change in policy. The rapprochement towards the Euro-Atlantic unipole is due to the present 
geopolitical considerations, with a more favourable EU/NATO policy opposed to a more 
aggressive Russian one and the change in domestic support from the Russian-speaking population 
to the Moldovan majority. The role of past geopolitics with Moldova being under 
Romanian/Russian (Soviet) occupation is also an important factor for all the actors involved. 
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1. Introduction 
Moscow's recent offensive in Georgia has worried former Soviet republics like Ukraine, Moldova 
and Azerbaijan.1 They see it as a return to old imperialist policies and fear they could be the next 
victims of Russian aggression. One of them, the Republic of Moldova2, is a country troubled by 
internal political fighting, with a weak economy and “sandwiched” between the EU and Russia. 
Foreign affairs are a domain of special importance for the leadership in Chisinau3 since Moldova 
seeks international recognition and support from the Western community. 
 
After independence Moldova conducted a “multi-vector” foreign and security policy vacillating 
between a pro-Romanian policy in the first half of the 1990s, when unification with Romania was 
discussed, and a pro-Russian policy in the latter part of the 1990s determined by the Transnistrian4 
conflict and the bad economy.5 In 2001 the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) 
became the first orthodox communist party to be elected back into power since the fall of the 
former Soviet Union.6 In the beginning it seemed that Vladimir Voronin, PCRM leader and the 
new elected president, was promoting the “Russification” of the country seen in the intention to 
introduce reforms like the compulsory Russian language training in secondary school the 
replacement of the curriculum text on Romanian history to one on Moldovan history and 
Moldovan membership in the Russian-Belarusian union.7 
 
But the “Slavic choice”8 of the Communist government became gradually less pronounced after it 
took office. The new leadership’s pro-Kremlin credentials notwithstanding, the Transnistrian 
                                                 
1 Luchterhandt, Otto (29.08.09): ”Ex-Soviet States Fear Russian Aggression”, Spiegel Online, accessed on the 10.09.09 
at  http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,575238,00.html  
2 Throughout the thesis I will use the shorter term of Moldova. 
3 Chisinau is the capital of Moldova. 
4 Transnistria, also known as Trans-Dniester, Transdniestria, and Pridnestrovie is a disputed region who was a part of 
the former Moldavian SSR. Since Moldova’s declaration of independence in 1990, a short war followed in 1992, and 
now the secessionist province is governed by the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR), which 
claims the left bank of the river Nistru (Dniester) and the city of Bendery within the former Moldavian SSR. The 
modern Republic of Moldova does not recognize the secession and considers PMR-controlled territories to be a part of 
Moldova's sovereign territory. The “president” of Transnistria is Igor Smirnov. Accessed 20.11.08 at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria  
5 International Crisis Group (2006): Moldova’s Uncertain Future, Europe Report no. 175, accessed 05.11.08 at 
http://www.conflictprevention.net/library/documents/europe/75_moldova_s_uncertain_future____cpp.pdf  
6 Hill, William (24.10.2008): “Who’s Next? Russia’s Cat and Mouse Game with Moldova”, Open Democracy News 
Analysis, accessed 1.11.2008 at www.opendemocracy.net. 
7 Emerson, Michael and Marius Vahl (2004): “Moldova and the Transnistrian Conflict”, in Bruno Coppieters et al.: 
Europeanization and Conflict Resolution: Case Studies from the European Periphery, Ghent: Academia Press, p. 22. 
8 “The Slavic choice” refers to the Moldovan government’s orientation towards Russia as a strategic partner in its 
foreign policy choices. Ibid. p. 23.  
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dispute proved as intractable for President Voronin as it had for previous administrations, and 
relations with Moscow quickly degenerated to open hostility, such as the interdiction of Moldovan 
wine import9 by Russia and higher prises for energy to Moldova.10 Beginning a second term in 
2005, PCRM made a radical change and committed itself to a program of cooperation with its 
domestic opponents focused on “Europeanization”. It promised domestic liberalisation, and 
introduced a new strategy for resolving the Transnistrian dispute based on increased reliance on 
Western actors in the negotiation process.11  
 
Taking into consideration that the government has changed from being semi-democratic to being 
communist, how can we explain this change in foreign and security policy from East to West? And 
is this only a surface change? The purpose of this thesis is to show how the new geopolitical reality 
in Europe, the rivalry between Russia and the West, has shaped the foreign and security policy of 
Moldova after independence in 1991, while focus will be on the period after the election of the 
Communist party in 2001. Whereas Moldovan foreign policy has become more aligned with 
Europe, economic considerations, especially concerning gas imports from Russia on which 
Moldova is totally dependent, have forced the country to balance competing needs and foreign 
policies. 
 
1.1 Scope of analysis and research question 
With this context in mind, it would be interesting to have a closer look at the foreign and security 
policy of Moldova and at the factors that have influenced the development into one or the other 
direction.  
 
The research question is therefore: 
How can we explain Moldova’s foreign and security policy after the Communists came to power in 2001?  
 
The thesis will take its point of departure in the development after Moldova became independent 
in 1991 as it is since then that one can talk about an independent foreign policy. The focus will 
though be on the foreign policy after 2001 when the Communists came to power because it is at 
                                                 
9 Wine export to Russia constituted 80% of Moldova’s total wine export in 2005  
10 Laar, Mart (10.06.2007): “Escape from Moscow”, The Guardian, accessed 29.10.08 at www.guardian.co.uk. 
11 Crowther, William (2007): “Moldova, Transnistria and the PCRM’ Turn to the West”, East European Quarterly, 
volume 41, no.3, pp. 285-289. 
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that point that Moldova changes its foreign policy in a more radical direction, towards the West, 
although one might expect another turn considering that there is a Communist government in 
power.  Furthermore, it is also in the beginning of the 2000’s that the EU begins to show more 
interest in Moldova and both Romania and Ukraine have a more favourable policy concerning 
both finding a solution to the Transnistrian conflict and higher level of trade relations. The period 
before 2001 is important in order to illustrate this change.  
 
Based on a realistic theoretical starting point, the analysis will focus on the following key factors 
that have had influence on conducting foreign and security policy. These are international 
institutions, geopolitics, Moldova’s idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state, and 
the physical base. 
   
In order to answer the research question, the constellation theory and the theory of the state, both 
belonging to the broader realist tradition, will be used. The purpose of the constellation theory is to 
explain how the geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic integration affects the external behaviour of non-pole 
powers by particularly looking at the challenges emanating from their respective salient 
environments, meaning that it both looks at the state’s constellation in the near abroad and in 
relation to the Euro-Atlantic unipole, though the focus is on the near abroad. Furthermore foreign 
policy behaviour can also be explained by both present and past geopolitics. As such the theory 
also looks at the domestic level of explaining foreign policy.12 With its emphasis on the near 
geopolitics, the theory will help explaining why Moldova has shaped its foreign policy in a 
direction that has been more influenced by the great power Russia rather than the EU and NATO. 
At the domestic level the constellation theory will be supplemented with Barry Buzan’s theory of 
the state.13 The theory of the state emphasizes that the idea of the state together with the 
institutions and the physical base are important factors for the security of a state and implicitly for 
its foreign policy. Although the constellation theory emphasises the historical legacy as a factor at 
the domestic level, it is a relational factor and as such it will be an integrative part of all three levels 
of analysis. 
 
                                                 
12 Mouritzen, Hans & Anders Wivel (2005): The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, London & N.Y.: Routledge. 
13 Buzan, Barry (1991a): People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post Cold War 
Era, Second Edition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Hemel Hampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
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But why study Moldova, one of Europe’s smallest and poorest countries? One of the reasons is the 
EU enlargement, which has brought Moldova in the near neighbourhood of the European Union.14 
In the context of the international fight against terrorism, there are fears that the existence of a 
failed state like Moldova or uncontrolled areas, like Transnistria, can have repercussions far 
beyond its respective region.15 Furthermore the conflict in Transnistria has brought illegal 
trafficking of drugs, guns and women near the EU and has made the EU interested in helping 
Moldova develop democratic institutions. A third reason is that Moldova has had some success in 
changing its course towards Europeanization while holding Russia at a distance and this could be 
a positive lesson for other former Soviet countries who want to come out of Russia’s influence.16 
Last but not least, not much has been written on Moldova and even less on Moldova’s foreign 
policy. Much of the material that exists concentrates on different aspects of the Moldovan foreign 
policy, like the relationship with Russia, or the relationship with the EU. With this thesis I hope to 
contribute with new aspects which can give a more complete picture of the subject in question. 
 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis begins with an introduction to the research question, the theory used and delimitations 
to the thesis. It is followed by the methodology which contains considerations around scientific 
tradition, empirical material and the choice of case design. Chapter three will introduce the 
constellation theory and the theory of the state and it will be argued that the combination of the 
two is compatible. It continues with a critique of the chosen theories, the analytical framework and 
theoretical expectations. The analysis will be at three levels: the Euro-Atlantic, the near geopolitical 
and the domestic one. The focus will be on the near geopolitical level, and international 
institutions, neighbouring countries and state factors will be discussed at the three levels. The 
analysis will try to give an answer to the questions asked in the introduction. The concluding 
remarks will put the analysis into perspective. The research question will be answered and the 
theory evaluated. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Popescu, Nicu (2006): “The EU and Transnistria. From Deadlock to Sustainable Settlement”, IPF Policy Brief, 
accessed 05.11.2008 at: http://www.policy.hu/npopescu/ipf%20info/IPF%201%20transnistria.pdf 
15 “The European Strategy of the Republic of Moldova”, Institute for Public Policy, pp. 6-10. 
16 Johansson, Andreas (2003): “Whither Moldova? Conflicts and Dangers in a Post-Soviet Republic”, FOI (Swedish 
Research Agency): Base data report, p. 27. 
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1.3 Delimitations and clarification of key concepts  
The analysis is temporally delimited to the time of Moldovan independence, after the breakdown 
of the Soviet Union in 1991. In order to see the change in policy it is important to look at the entire 
period after the independence. I will though look more into details at the period after 2001 as it is 
this period where a shift in foreign policy towards “Europeanization” is seen. The history of the 
country is also taken stock of in the analysis of the domestic level of politics.  
 
As this thesis deals with foreign policy, the foreign policy concept should be defined. When 
analysing foreign policy several aspects should be considered17: 
1. the goals of foreign policy 
2. the process through which foreign policy is made 
3. the substance of policy 
4. foreign policy outcomes. 
This thesis will only deal with the substance of foreign policy. According to Svendsen, “foreign 
policy should be classified according to its substance” such as the means (i.e. military, economic, 
diplomatic) employed, its level of activity, whether or not it is bilateral, multilateral, etc.18 This 
definition concurs very well with the realistic starting point of the thesis.  
Other concepts important to this thesis will be defined in the chapter of theory framework as they 
are a part of explaining the theory.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Svendsen, Bo Anker (1980): “Eventsdata: En tilfredsstillende operationalisering af udenrigspolitik”, Politica, bind 
11, p. 21. 
18 Ibid. p. 21 
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2. Methodology and data 
In this chapter the method and the research strategy used for analysis will be presented. These are 
critical rationalism and case studies. The empirical material will also be commented on. 
 
2.1 Scientific tradition  
This thesis takes its methodological starting point in modified critical rationalism19. Critical 
rationalism as formulated by Karl Popper20 takes the view that we don't have ultimate answers 
and scientists must try to approach scientific truths through critical and rational questions to the 
existing.21 What Popper pointed out is that you can never justify any scientific theory, but you can 
falsify it.22 For the purpose of this thesis, whether a theory is false or not is not so important when 
evaluating existing theories. As King, Keohane and Verba rightly emphasize, the question is more 
“how much of the world the theory can help us explain”.23 The advantage of critical rationalism is 
that, even in a situation where the empirical results do not concur with the expectations, the 
produced knowledge can contribute to correct future research.24  
 
With regard to this thesis, modified critical rationalism is used to structure the analysis in the way 
that the thesis starts by stating a research problem and then a solution to it is suggested and 
confronted with the empirical evidence. In the end the problem is restated based on the analysis 
and the basic procedure is repeated but from a better starting point.25  
 
2.2 The case study approach: advantages and problems 
The thesis is designed as an empirical, qualitative case study analysis of Moldovan foreign policy 
after the end of the Cold War with an emphasis on the period after the PCRM took power.  
 
                                                 
19 Wivel, Anders (2000): The Integration Spiral. International Security and European Integration 1945-1999.  Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Copenhagen: Institute of Political Science, pp. 21-34. 
20 Popper, Karl (1968): The Logic of Scientific Discovery, New York: Harper and Row. 
21 Gilje, Nils & Harald Grimmen (1998): Samfunnsvitenskapens forutsetninger, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, pp. 66-69 on 
Popper’s Critical Rationalism. 
22 Popper (1968): pp. 250-252. 
23 King, Gary, Robert Keohane & Sidney Verba (1994): Designing Social Inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 101.  
24 Popper (1968), pp. 67-68. 
25 Wivel (2000): p. 33. 
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The case study is a useful analytical framework for research that “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”.26 In other words, it is 
a particularly well-suited approach to studies of phenomena which cannot be understood in 
separation from the contextual conditions. This fairly well describes the aim of this study, namely 
to analyse Moldovan foreign policies within the context of the broader geopolitical situation. 
Furthermore “how” questions are well suited in conducting an explanatory case study27 and my 
intention is to explain how Moldovan foreign policy has developed.  
 
A primary distinction in designing case studies is between single and multiple-case designs.28  
The choice of a single case, like the one in this thesis, can be criticised by not having a strong 
external validity as one cannot generalise to other countries’ foreign policy.29 The purpose of this 
thesis is to get into depth with the case in question and for this reason case study research is the 
most appropriate method. The conclusions reached do not pretend universal validity30 but as the 
case study is aimed at examining case-specific facts and outcomes, this research might be useful in 
understanding general outcomes of similar cases, in this situation other ex-Soviet countries which 
have had similar conditions. 
 
Having the chosen theory as a starting point, the introduction briefly mentioned the variables that 
are essential for the purpose of analysis. Afterwards it will be investigated how these variables 
have changed during the period of research and decide which ones have had influence on the 
formation of foreign policy. The choice of theory, on the other hand, depends on the chosen 
research question. As such the chosen method is both inductive and deductive, in the way that the 
theory is chosen on the basis of what it is relevant for the case (induction) while the case 
afterwards is analysed from the perspective of the chosen theory (deduction).31 One can criticise 
the choice of some independent variables rather than others and the effect of those on the 
analysis.32 I find this a relevant critique. For the purpose of this thesis, it is more significant to 
                                                 
26 Yin, Robert (2003): Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage: Thousand Oaks, p. 23. 
27 Ibid. p. 6. 
28 Ibid. p. 39. 
29 Van Evera, Stephen (1997): Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, New York: Cornell University Press, 
chapter 2; Yin (1994): chapter 1. 
30 Yin (2003): p. 33-37. 
31 Bryman, Alan (2004): Social Research Methods, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 8-11. 
32 George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew (2005): Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. 
Cambridge & London: MIT Press, p. 25. 
 13
choose a few variables which can qualitatively be analysed into details. This means that there can 
be other factors that have influence but there are always some variables that are more important 
than others. One way to help choosing the variables with the strongest influence is by making the 
research over a longer period of time and with different policy changes. In this way several 
observations are made for the same case.33 In the case of Moldova, I have chosen to look at both the 
period before and after the Communists came to power in order to have a better understanding of 
the policy change from East to West. 
 
In order to comply with critics of using case study two concrete methodological tools will be used: 
congruence and process-tracing. Van Evera34 believes that these methods are suitable for testing 
theories but as the purpose of this thesis is not to test the theory it will be drawn on them as 
systematic analysing tools that can be used to explain the empirical research problem.35 The 
congruence method can be used to explore if a chosen theory has enough explanatory power.36 In 
this way it is the theory that helps to see if there is “congruence or incongruence between values 
observed on the independent and dependent variables”.37 In this way one can easily see if the 
theory will have explanatory power in a chosen case. In the case of Moldova through the 
congruence method the constellation theory will help show that changes in foreign policy are 
dependent on Moldova’s environmental constellation. 
 
This method has some disadvantages though. One important problem is whether the independent 
variable really explains the dependent one or if there is a randomly coincidence or a third variable 
on which both variables are dependent.38 To avoid these problems another method will be used, 
process-tracing.  
 
In process-tracing the investigator explores the chain of events by which initial case conditions are 
translated into case outcomes.39 In order to demonstrate that an explanatory variable causes a 
dependent variable, a list of causal links between the two variables should be identified, meaning 
that process-tracing can help demonstrate if the intervening variables explain the independent 
                                                 
33 Ibid. pp. 32-33. 
34 Van Evera (1997):  p. 56. 
35 George & Bennett (2005): p. 181. 
36 Ibid. p. 181. 
37 Van Evera (1997): p. 58. 
38 George & Bennett (2005): pp. 185-192. 
39 Van Evera (1997): p. 64. 
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variable.40 Consequently the variables from the analysis will be selected on the basis of the chosen 
theory and some aspects of the case will be given more importance than others. By process-tracing 
the course of action is followed towards a certain decision. In the case of Moldova, process-tracing 
will help analyse how foreign policy decisions are made. It will be looked at the most important 
actors, such as the EU, NATO, Russia, Ukraine or Romania and at relevant events in order to see 
how they interact to decide foreign behaviour. Such events can be lessons from the past which 
persist through socialisation and other mechanisms and as such have a restrictive influence on 
foreign policy. All in all, a thick description will be made through the theoretical lenses in order to 
determine the most relevant factors.   
 
2.3 Data and Sources 
The data material used in this thesis comes from many different sources like statistical data, official 
documents and speeches, newspapers from Moldova and Romania, journals and books. The use of 
both quantitative and qualitative materials and different methods for gathering data is called 
triangulation and it is used in order to increase the validity of the analysis.41 The use of multiple 
sources of evidence will allow this analysis to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal, 
and behavioural issues. Thus any finding or conclusion will be more convincing and accurate if it 
is based on several different sources of information.42 
 
The data material gathered is in Danish, English and Romanian/Moldovan. I have the advantage 
of being able to read Romanian, which is almost identical to the language spoken in Moldova. It 
will hopefully give me the possibility to get some angles of the research question which would not 
have been accessible otherwise.43 I have been able to access sources from Moldova, including 
newspapers, journals and other research sites, among the most important it can be mentioned: 
Moldova Azi, Infotag, Democracy and Governing in Moldova, the Institute for Public Policy, 
Moldova org., Flux, The Tiraspol Times, Jurnal de Chisinau. Two Romanian newspapers have also 
                                                 
40 King et. al (1994): p. 86. 
41 Bryman: p. 275. 
42 Yin (2003): p. 92. 
43 I am aware that I can be influenced by the fact that I am Romanian as there are some sensitive issues between 
Romanians and Moldovans, especially concerning the use of “the Moldovan language” as the official language in 
Moldova in spite of Romania’s repeatedly protests on the existence of such a language. See  Damian, George (15 
October 2007): “Romania inghite ‘limba moldoveneasca’” (Romania swallows ‘the Moldovan language’), Ziua, 
accessed on the1st of November 2008 at http://www.ziua.ro/display.php?data=2007-10-15&id=227982 ; Damian, 
George (18 October 2008): “Presiunile Chisinaului pentru ‘limba moldoveneasca’” (Chisinau’s pressions for ‘the 
Moldovan language’), Ziua, accessed on the 1st of November 2008 at http://ziua.net/display.php?data=2008-10-
18&id=244228. 
 15
been used: Ziua and Gandul. Romanian history books written after the revolution44 together with 
Charles King’s History of the Moldovans will be used to insure the accuracy of the history of 
Moldova from the origins. Danish and other foreign newspapers and news agencies have also been 
useful, for ex. Berlingske Tidende, BBC Romanian, Radio Free Europe.45  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 History books during the Ceausescu regime were an adaptation of the truth in the way the president found it 
appropriate, with many aspects of the history missing or interpreted according to the viewpoints of the president. After 
1989, the history of Romanians was written anew.  
45 One should be aware of sources that can be biased such as newspapers from Moldova and Romania. The Moldovan 
government has censured the media but mostly the audio-visual one. Electronic media is freer to write what they choose 
as not many Moldovans are able to access the internet. The newspapers I have used are all electronic and by choosing 
several of them the reliability is increased and it has given me the opportunity to see which ones that are pro/contra the 
governing rule.  The Romanian newspapers can also be biased if we take into consideration the turbulent relation 
Romania has with Moldova. By comparing with other foreign newspapers, I have been able to see the accuracy of these 
newspapers and used them when accurate. 
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3. Theoretical framework 
The chapter will start by an introduction to the realistic research programme and to why I have 
chosen to take my point of departure in it. Following I will discuss the constellation theory and the 
theory of the state and argue that the combination of the two is compatible. Concrete examples 
related to the empirical analysis will be given along the discussion of the theory. The choice of the 
two theories over other approaches will be commented on. 
 
3.1 Realism and foreign policy analysis 
The theoretical framework takes its point of departure in the contemporary structural realist 
research programme. Realism is a continuous work in progress and after the end of the Cold War 
and the subsequent critique of the neorealist perspective on international relations, new realist 
approaches and theories have come into existence.46 The new developments have allowed for more 
detailed studies on foreign policy. 
 
In order to understand the theoretical framework of this thesis it is important to look at the 
development of realism since Waltz introduced the neorealist theory with his book Theory of 
International Politics in 1979. This thesis starts, like Waltz, from the premise that the international 
system is anarchic, meaning that “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using 
violence, or the threat of violence, to dominate or even destroy them”.47 The most important actors 
in the international system are the states and they are seen as rational actors. In the absence of an 
overarching authority, states must focus primarily on their own survival and security. As such 
every state worries about its relative power vis-à-vis other states and tends to base its foreign 
policy on power calculations rather than factors like ideology or culture. Therefore, the 
international realm is dominated by power politics.48 
 
According to Waltz, power politics are played out in different ways depending on the distribution 
of power in the international system.49 That depends on the number of great powers and Waltz 
distinguishes between bipolar systems, systems with two great powers, and multipolar systems, 
                                                 
46 For a thorough discussion of realist theories see Mastanduno (1997), Rose (1998), Rathbun (2008). 
47 Grieco, Joseph M. (1990): Cooperation Among Nations, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 38. 
48 Hansen, Birthe, Peter Toft & Anders Wivel (2003):”Lost Power. The American World Order and the Politics of 
Adaptation”, Arbejdspapir 2003/04, Københavns Universitet: Institut for Statskundskab, p. 5. 
49 Waltz, Kenneth (1979): Theory of International Politics, New York: Random House, pp. 129-138. 
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systems with more than two great powers.50 Neorealism has been challenged especially after the 
end of the Cold War, as Waltz foresaw that a situation where one super power dominates the 
international system would be much more unstable than a system with two or more super 
powers.51 Neorealism anticipated that USA’ hegemonic position would be on a short term, as one 
or more states would try to balance USA and create a more stable bi-/multipolarity. That has not 
happened yet. On the contrary we have seen other states wanting to collaborate with USA instead 
of challenging its power position.52  
 
Waltz’ theory is systemic and as such it explains results of international events and therefore 
cannot explain specific foreign policy.53 In order to make a comprehensive study of foreign policy 
one has to combine structural variables with regional and domestic ones. A foreign policy analysis 
based only on structural variables can thus in many cases only give us a very general 
understanding of a single state’s foreign policy.54 As Waltz emphasises it, structural factors can 
explain why states act in the same way in many areas. The anarchic structure of the international 
system helps understand why almost all states have chosen a defence and security policy as a part 
of their foreign policy. It also explains why states under multipolarity usually change alliances 
more often than under bipolarity, as their change has importance for the changing power 
balance.55 But structural variables do not explain why states act differently in similar situations.56 It 
is important to look at the non-systemic variables’ effect on foreign policy.  
 
Neoclassical realism (NCR) incorporates both external and internal variables. According to NCR, 
the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the 
international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. However, the 
impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic 
pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level.57  
                                                 
50 Waltz (1979): p. 69. 
51 Kreisler, Harry (2002): “Theory and International Politics: Conversation with Kenneth N. Waltz” i Kompendium 1. 
International Politik 2005/2006, Københavns Universitet: Institut for Statskundskab, pp. 6-9. 
52 Wivel, Anders (2008):”Balancing against threats or bandwagoning with power? Europe and the transatlantic 
relationship after the Cold War”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.21, no. 3, pp. 292-295. 
53 Walt, Stephen (2005):’“A Few Big and Important Things”: The Enduring Legacy of Kenneth Waltz’, Tidskriftet 
Politik, årgang 8, no. 3, pp.48-51. 
54 Wivel, Anders (2005a): ”Indenrigspolitik, ideer og etik: Tre udfordringer til neorealistisk udenrigspolitikanalyse”, 
Tidsskriftet Politik, årgang 8, nr. 3, p. 61. 
55 Waltz (1979): pp. 91-121. 
56 Wivel (2000): p. 140. 
57 Rose, Gideon (1998): “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, vol. 51, p. 146. 
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 Neoclassical realism can, though, be criticised for not having a clear internal logic and for not 
arguing why some factors are more relevant than others.58 Furthermore they seem to be “unable to 
account for the link between international structure and foreign policy”, a problem that the 
structural realists also face.59 For these reasons I have chosen to use the constellation theory, which 
is seen as an expansion of NCR.     
 
Revitalizing an explicit focus on foreign policy, the constellation theory reintroduces some of the 
central insights included in classical realism. By applying their own variant of NCR to non-pole 
powers—and not only great powers—Mouritzen and Wivel expand the explanatory scope of NCR 
considerably and make it more suitable for the purpose of this thesis. 
 
3.2 The constellation theory 
What distinguishes the constellation theory from other neoclassical realists and the reasons for 
which it is relevant to this thesis are the following.60 First of all the theory theorizes also on the 
non-pole powers, rather than only the great powers. This is particularly relevant for this thesis as 
Moldova is definitely a non-pole power if we look at the country in relation to other states in 
Europe.61 Second, state location has an important role on foreign policy, in so doing it emphasizes 
the role of geopolitics. It will be shown that the location of Moldova in a region predominated by 
power struggles makes geopolitics one of the main explanations for the conduct of Moldovan 
foreign policy. Third, the concept of polarity is reformulated in order to explain non-pole power 
behaviour. Polarity is viewed from the perspective of the particular state, whose behaviour one 
wishes to explain. In this way the theory will help look at the Moldovan foreign policy from the 
perspective of the polarity in the near neighbourhood, where Moldova has to relate to Romania, 
Ukraine and Russia as well as the EU and NATO.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
58 Wivel, Anders (2002): “Realismen efter Waltz: Udvikling eller afvikling?, Politica, vol. 34, no. 4, p. 441; Wivel 
(2005a): p. 62. 
59 Wivel, Anders (2005b):”The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the Development 
of the EU as a Security Actor”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 43, no. 2, p. 357. 
60 Ibid p. 3. 
61 See definition of a non-pole power later in this chapter. 
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3.2.1 A pole vs. a non-pole state 
Terms like ‘pole’, ‘great power’ and ‘small states’ are usually defined in different ways, being no 
consensus among international relations’ researchers.62 The theory of constellation defines the 
difference between a pole and a non-pole power from the perspective of the power they exercise 
and not from the perspective of the power they possess as it has traditionally been done.63 It is the 
position of the state in a specific spatio-temporal context that determines whether the state is a pole 
or a non-pole power.  
 
A pole may consist of one or more closely cooperating ‘pole powers’ or ‘pole states’. In order to be 
a ‘pole power’ the states should be essential to the pole’s power projection and proper functioning 
in its sphere. ‘Non-pole powers’ are all the other states. No matter their position in the structure, 
the structure will persist as it is, thus the Euro-Atlantic power configuration and its institutional 
expression is the same and the states are stuck with it no matter what their relation to it.64 
 
Mouritzen and Wivel have divided the European non-pole states in several geographical 
groupings65 where Moldova belongs to the Eastern group. These non-pole states have in common 
a wish to distance themselves from the old Eastern structures and embrace the Western values 
which actually constitute the Euro-Atlantic pole. This commitment, the lack of alternative to the 
Euro-Atlantic pole and their relative poorness has given these countries a weak negotiation 
position towards the Euro-Atlantic unipole.66 
 
3.2.2 Polarity 
The concept of polarity used by Mouritzen and Wivel is different from the one Waltz uses. 
According to neorealism the anarchical structure produces system-wide dynamics which are 
determined by the relative strength of states to one another, and therefore by the distribution of 
                                                 
62 For more details see Browning, Christopher (2006):”Small, Smart and Salient? Rethinking Identity in the Small 
States Literature”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol.19, no.4.  
63 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 3. 
64 Ibid. p. 4. 
65 The pole power neighbours include the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria and Germany. The North 
consists of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, and Finland. The South consists of France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, 
Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus, Ireland. The East consists of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia. The North-East consists of the Baltic 
countries.  
66 Ibid p. 10. 
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relative power across the system.67 Great powers or pole powers set the agenda in international 
politics, primarily because they can and because they must. Minor states or non-pole powers, i.e. 
all states that are not defined as pole powers, must follow along. The pole powers’ agenda per 
definition constrains minor states.68 In order to be a pole power one has to achieve a high score “on 
all the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, 
military strength, political stability, and competence”.69  
 
According to Mouritzen and Wivel the systemic polarity looks at the power structure from above 
and as such cannot explain thoroughly the behaviour of a particular state. Instead they focus on 
the relational polarity, on “how the poles constrain a particular state’s power position and 
behaviour”, meaning the latter’s “environmental polarity”.70 One should therefore commence by 
taking a ‘frog perspective’, in this way focusing on the exercise of power rather than the possession 
of it.71 This perspective can though have the disadvantage of only looking at one part of the world 
instead of giving a whole picture. However, it can be argued for the importance of this particular 
perspective for the behaviour of the state under discussion.72 
 
Moldova’s relational polarity is dominated by Russia as the most important pole in terms of power 
exercise as Russia projects its power by holding Moldova dependent on energy and trade in other 
economic areas and by its military presence in Transnistria. The EU is increasing in importance for 
Moldova being seen as an alternative to the Russian dominance and as a factor that can bring a 
solution to the conflict in Transnistria. Although a neutral country, NATO is important for 
Moldova in its fight to have the Russian troops withdraw from Transnistria. Non-membership of 
NATO has kept Russia from militarily intervening in Moldova since the end of the short war in 
Transnistria. Romania and Ukraine are also two pole powers with influence on Moldova, both 
economically and in terms of national identity. Thus, one can say that the polarity around 
Moldova can be seen as multipolarity with some pole powers having more influence than others.  
 
                                                 
67 Mouritzen, Hans (1998): Theory and Reality in International Politics, Aldershot & Vermont: Ashgate,  p. 25. 
68 Waltz (1979): pp. 96-99. 
69 Ibid p. 131. 
70 Ibid p. 16. 
71 Thorhallsson, Baldur & Anders Wivel (2006): “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know and What 
Would We Like to Know?”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 19, no. 4, p. 654. 
72 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): pp. 16-17. 
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Mouritzen and Wivel argue that Moldova has a bipolar environment polarity, being a “shatter 
zone between the Euro-Atlantic and the Russian pole”.73 I disagree with them, and as shown above 
the different actors have different influence on Moldova and this will be shown in the analysis 
chapter.  Actually, Mouritzen and Wivel argue themselves that the near environment is important. 
In the case of Moldova, besides Russia, Ukraine and Romania are two power poles whose 
influence cannot be neglected. As I have argued for multipolarity, one might be surprised that 
USA is not one of the important poles for Moldova, as it has been for most of Central and East 
European countries. Based on empirical research, I find USA’s role less important than the one of 
the EU and NATO. USA is together with the EU observer in the Transnistrian conflict but it has 
not have much influence on the process. At the same time USA has neglected Transnistria and 
Moldova because not much seems to be at stake in the short term.74 There has been no armed 
fighting or ethnic unrest and USA finds no reason to destroy its relationship with Russia for the 
sake of Moldova. Another reason for choosing NATO rather than USA is that USA mostly projects 
its power on Europe indirectly through NATO. 
 
3.2.3 Geopolitics 
As seen from above the constellation theory gives focus to the salient environment of the states. In 
this way it emphasizes the role of geopolitics on states’ behaviour. Geopolitics is defined as “the 
influence of geography on states’ political character, their history, institutions and especially 
relations with other states”.75 As distance and space are the essential categories of geography, 
geopolitics helps us understand what distance between states, especially to pole powers, means for 
their behaviour and the relations between them.76 Furthermore, the end of the Cold War has 
brought back the importance of location for states from a bipolar world view. A re-
territorialisation of international politics takes place and this means that local polarities, conflicts, 
and cooperation prevail. This can be especially seen in regions experiencing state fragmentation 
like Soviet Union has.77 System polarity and interdependence do have though a modifying effect 
over time.78  
 
                                                 
73 Ibid p.198. 
74 Smith, Pamela Hyde (2005b): “Moldova Matters: Why Progress is still Possible on Ukraine’s Southwestern Flank”, 
Occasional Thesis, Washington: The Atlantic Council of the United States, p. 
75 Hay, William (2003):”Geopolitics of Europe”, Orbis, vol. 47, no. 2, p. 296. 
76 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 2; Mouritzen (2006a; 2006b): 145; 498. 
77 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 19. 
78 Mouritzen (2006a): p. 145. 
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For Moldova this means that Russia still has a more dominant role in the way Moldova behaves, 
than the EU or NATO do. Such an example is the neutrality status of Moldova which is conceived 
in order to keep Russia satisfied but also as an instrument to use against the presence of Russian 
troops on its territory and as an excuse for not getting involved into CIS79 military structures that 
would imply in many ways the depriving of its independence.80  
 
3.2.4 The European power structure 
The post Cold War systemic polarity, where capabilities determine the power positions in the 
international system, sees USA as the only superpower while neither the EU nor any European 
states can be seen as a systemic pole or as a regional pole when it comes to capability.81 The 
constellation theory uses instead relational polarity, where the focus is on power projection instead 
of power possession, which means that it is possible to identify which power(s) that is/are able to 
distribute positive and negative sanctions across Europe. In nowadays Europe the only pole 
existing is the Euro-Atlantic pole which is constituted by the EU and the United States/NATO.  
When it comes to non-pole states, many of them are affiliated with the pole through the EU and 
NATO. They function as an institutional superstructure which has important implications for 
these. One implication is that, considering the decentralized nature of the pole, there are no 
definitive prescriptions for acceptable foreign policy behaviour and that any prescription is 
negotiable, at least for EU members and those who wish to become EU members.82 
 
Furthermore the Euro-Atlantic pole projects its power through positive or negative incentives83 
States that are outside the superstructure may be rewarded for promoting and safeguarding the 
pole’s basic values and the stability of the region, the main reward being membership of the two 
                                                 
79The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Russian: Содружество Независимых Государств (СНГ), 
transliterated Sodruzhestvo Nezavisimykh Gosudarstv (SNG)) is a regional organization whose participating countries 
are former Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan).  
80 Gabanyi, Anneli Ute (2008):”The Republic of Moldova and NATO – an Ambiguous Relationship”, Security Policy 
Library, no.3, Oslo: Den norske Atlanterhavskomité, p. 6. 
81 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 24. 
82 EU has low self-control because of its decentralized nature as EU consists of 27 member states which are autonomous 
in many areas. Outside actors may play off EU subunits against each other. The weakness of the EU in security and 
defence affairs and the important role of US allow NATO to play an important role and this decreases the self-control of 
the Euro-Atlantic pole. Besides, NATO has also a decentralised nature because of the intergovernmental structure, 
which weakens further more the nature of the Euro-Atlantic pole.    
83 Economic sanctions as a punishment and market access as a reward. 
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institutions. But states can also be punished by military action or sanctions of other kind in case 
they threaten the stability of the region.84 
 
As an outsider and under the geopolitical influence of Russia for most of the 1990s, Moldova did 
not stir the EU’s or NATO’s attention until it was close to becoming neighbour to both of them. As 
a neutral country, Moldova has restrained itself from becoming a NATO member and this has 
consequently resulted in the increased role of the EU for Moldova. Moldova’s rapprochement 
towards the EU, in defiance of Russia’s threats, has made the EU reward the country by including 
Moldova in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and signing an Action Plan with it in 
2005.85 
 
3.2.5 The European Constellations 
The general implications for the non-pole powers mentioned above do normally vary with the 
location of the states. Therefore, it is important to look at the constellation of the individual states. 
Constellation is defined as “the non-pole power’s basic set of relationships to the strong powers in 
its salient environment”.86 Constellation is the link between the polarity and each state’s specific 
salient environment and is identified in accordance with the states’ institutional affiliation with the 
EU and NATO. There are four categories: core insiders, near-core insiders, would-be insiders and 
outsiders, and Moldova belongs to the last category. The way a state approaches or distances itself 
from the pole is by enlargement of the pole’s superstructure. After Romania became EU member in 
2007, Moldova has come to border the pole superstructure. According to Mouritzen and Wivel the 
primary factor that determines European states’ influence-capability and action space is EU 
affiliation. While NATO affiliation is also important, it is seen as secondary in comparison, the 
reason for that being that EU has a “finalité, an integrationist ideology that is absent in NATO”.87 It 
is expected that constellations do not only matter in relation to the pole but also in relation to other 
states. In this case, Moldova has different relation to Romania, which is neighbour and EU 
member, than it has to Ukraine or Russia.88 
 
                                                 
84 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 28. 
85 Popescu, Nicu (2005):”The EU in Moldova – Settling Conflicts in the Neighbourhood”, Occasional Thesis, no.60, 
Brussels: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 29-43.  
86 Mouritzen (1991): p. 218, quoted in Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 29. 
87 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 31. 
88 Poulsen-Hansen, Lars & Ole Wæver (1996):”Ukraine” in Hans Mouritzen, Ole Wæver & Håkan Wiberg (eds.): 
European Integration and National Adaptations, NY: Nova Science Publishers, p. 231. 
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The capability of states to achieve their external goals depends on their possibility to exercise both 
offensive and defensive power. Offensive power is the ability to influence other actors to do 
something they would not otherwise do. Defensive power is the ability to avoid being affected by 
the actions of others.89 
 
As an outsider, Moldova is much less influenced by the Euro-Atlantic unipole than insiders or 
would-be insiders are. Membership for outsiders is either not desired or not feasible in the short or 
mid-term future. Although Moldova could become a member in the long-term future, there are no 
guarantees. At the moment Moldova is envisaged by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)90 
which could be seen as an alternative to the EU enlargement. As Smith remarks, the ENP was 
launched to address the ‘enlargement fatigue’ of the EU.91 However, although it is not about 
enlargement, the ENP does not close any doors to European countries like Moldova that may at 
some future point wish to apply for membership.92  
 
The autonomy of the outsiders is likely to be considerable; nevertheless, they do depend in varying 
degrees economically or culturally on the Euro-Atlantic unipole as they do not have any other to 
turn to. If they decide to give up some of their autonomy in order to receive some of the benefits of 
the pole order, this may lead to a reduced autonomy but without any increase in influence-
capability.93 So the question is how to elaborate alternative offers of integration that maintain or 
achieve a sustainable balance between conditionality and socialisation94 without having the 
membership option in the near sight.95 This is an issue that can be felt in the relationship between 
Moldova and the EU as, although Moldova’s rhetoric around its European orientation is very 
strong, the actual actions of adapting to the aquis are very few, as Moldova has no guarantees to a 
European future. The same can be seen in the relationship with NATO. Although Moldova has 
                                                 
89 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 33. 
90 European Commission (2004): European Neighbourhood Policy Country Report –Moldova, accessed 22nd October 
2008 at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/moldova_enp_country_report_2004_en.pdf. 
91 Smith, K. E. (2005a), ‘The outsiders: The European neighbourhood policy’, International 
Affaires, 81(4), pp. 757-773. 
92 Ferrero-Waldner, B. (2004): Press Conference to launch first seven Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, Speech/04/529, accessed 22nd October at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_ 
relations/news/ferrero/2004/sp04_529.htm. 
93 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 34. 
94 Conditionality and socialisation have to be achieved by the candidate countries in the enlargement process. 
Conditionality is defined as the contractual relation where aid and institutional ties to the EU are contingent on specific 
reforms in the candidate countries. Socialisation refers to the multi-leveled process inducing behavioural changes in 
candidate countries through social learning. See Tassinari (2006): p. 7. 
95 Tassinari (2006): “Variable Geometries. Mapping Ideas, Institutions and Power in the Wider Europe”, CEPS Working 
Document, no. 254, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, p. 8. 
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committed to the Individual Partnership Action Plan, it has not yet implemented any of its 
provisions.     
 
3.2.6 The shadow of the past: historical lessons and domestic politics 
According to the constellation theory the domestic factors that influence foreign policy behaviour 
often refer to crucial historic experiences, sedimented as lessons in the state’s political culture, both 
in broader layers and in the elite. These lessons are an effect of past foreign policy and they 
influence the priority given to national autonomy.96 They can be positive or negative. The positive 
ones, repeat a ‘success’ and can have a restrictive influence on the future decision-makers as 
factors of inertia. The negative ones refer to past experienced failures that should be avoided in the 
future.97 In general negative geopolitics predominates. 
 
In particular the existence of a past hegemon is important due to the traumatic effect it has on a 
non-pole power. If the hegemon can be related to the Euro-Atlantic unipole then the Euro-Atlantic 
unipole’s attraction will diminish. On the other side, if there is no connection, then, the Euro-
Atlantic unipole will be very attractive as it can give protection against future threats from the 
hegemon.98   
 
It is not easy to prove to what degree lessons of history are the ones influencing the decision-
making process and the constellation theory does not go further explaining what elements one 
should look at in order to determine that. One can supplement with Khong which shows in his 
book “Analogies at War” how analogies influence the decision makers. He uses what he calls the 
analogical explanation which “essentially takes an information-processing approach to 
understanding decision-making”.99 In making decisions we lean on our experiences. Every person 
has a subjective view about how the social or political world works.100 Knowledge structures such 
analogies or schemes are the fundamental elements for interpreting sensory data, for retrieving 
information and for guiding human information-processing.101  
 
                                                 
96 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 38-39. 
97 Mouritzen (2006b): p. 500. 
98 Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): p. 170. 
99 Khong, Yuen Foong (1992): Analogies at War. Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, 
New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 40. 
100 Ibid. p. 26. 
101 Ibid. p. 28. 
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One cannot say that Moldova as a state has a past foreign policy as it has only been a state since 
1991 but they definitely have a ghost of the past – namely the Russian Empire/the Soviet Union 
which they had been a part of since 1812, when Russia took Bessarabia102 from the Ottoman 
Empire. Moldova has not been an independent state except for during the 16th century when it 
constituted together with other parts of Romania and Ukraine, the Kingdom of Moldova.103 One 
consequence of being a part of the Soviet Union is the economic dependency on Russian oil and 
gas plus trade with other important goods which have Russia as the main exporter. Russia has 
used these levers as “weapons” in order to keep Moldova in its sphere of influence.104 Another one 
is the large Russian-speaking minority which, as in the case of Transnistria, pushes for regional 
autonomy.105 There has been a tendency to both balance Russia but also to bandwagon it as 
Moldova didn’t feel they had any other option, considering that the Euro-Atlantic unipole has only 
recently began to show more interest towards the region. Consequently, although past geopolitics 
is an important factor at the domestic level, in the case of Moldova it has a great influence on all 
levels of analysis. 
 
3.3 The theory of the state 
Past geopolitics is an important domestic factor, but the constellation theory does not tell us what 
exactly lies behind it and how to couple it to the present domestic situation. The internal affairs of 
Moldova are more than past geopolitics and we need a theory to explain the present power play. 
As a consequence the domestic level will be complemented with Buzan’s theory of the state. 
According to Buzan, states are the most powerful type of unit in the international system and as 
such they are the most important unit of security in the international realm.106 Security issues 
within an international anarchy are highly conditioned not only by the structure of the system and 
by the interaction of states, but also by the domestic characteristics of states.107  
 
                                                 
102 Bessarabia is the part of the Republic of Moldova which lays between the Prut and Nistru rivers and which 
constituted until the 18th century the eastern half of the Principality of Moldavia, but inherited its historical name from 
Russia after it was incorporated into the Empire. Accessed  12.12.08 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bessarabia  
103 Constantiniu, Florin (1997): O Istorie Sincera a Poporului Roman (A Sincere History of the Romanian People), 
Bucuresti: Univers Enciclopedic, pp. 55-141.  
104 Hedenskog, Jakob m.fl. (2005): Russia as a Great Power. Dimensions of security under Putin, London & New York: 
Routledge, pp. 143-146. 
105 Schmidtke, Oliver & Serhy Yekelchyk (2008): ”Introduction” in same eds., Europe’s Last Frontier? Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine between Russia and the European Union, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, p. 3. 
106 Buzan, Barry et al. (1998):”Realism vs. cosmopolitanism. A debate between Barry Buzan and David Held conducted 
by Anthony McGrew”, Review of International Studies, vol. 24, pp. 387-398. 
107 Buzan, Barry (1991a): People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post.Cold War 
Era, Second Edition, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, Hemel Heampstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 146-147. 
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Although Buzan himself considers his theory as a neorealist one, he argues that the ‘straitjacket’ 
militaristic approach to security that dominated the discourse during the Cold War was ‘simple-
minded’108 He subsequently broadened it to also include political, economic, social and 
environmental threats.109 Furthermore, he incorporates domestic politics and ideas in his theory, in 
this way he is approaching the neoclassical realists which use domestic politics and ideas “to flesh 
out the concept of power, the central variable in neorealism”.110 We cannot understand power 
without reference to what happens within states and how people think and what they believe.111 
 
From the abovementioned we can see that Buzan fits very well in the broader realist tradition112, 
just like the constellation theory does, and as such it can be used to supplement the constellation 
theory. In other words, factors from different levels will be combined to explain the foreign policy 
of Moldova. The constellation theory contributes with factors mostly at the Euro-Atlantic level and 
near geopolitical level. Buzan will contribute with factors concerning present power politics at the 
domestic level. The constellation theory has the advantage of being a theory that is fit for analysing 
small powers in relation to both the Euro-Atlantic pole and the great powers in the 
neighbourhood. These elements are not present in Buzan’s theory but he does have a well 
developed model for the factors at the domestic level that influence foreign behaviour. Legacy of 
the past will constitute a variable at all levels of analysis, thus modifying the constellation theory’s 
placement of it at the domestic one. 
 
Although Buzan’s theory includes constructivist elements such as the concepts of nation, identity 
and ideas, these will be used to see what lies behind the realistic notion of power. In the case of 
Moldova national identity has been determined by the geopolitical constellation. So, realist and 
constructivist variables are not necessarily mutually exclusive as they can explain different issues. 
Buzan defines the state in terms of a political, territorial and societal unit that consists of three 
components: the idea of the state, the institutional expression of the state and the physical base of 
the state. 
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3.3.1 The idea of the state 
This is the most central part of the state but also the most abstract and difficult to investigate. A 
state is based on an idea, which lies at the heart of the political identity of the state, that is, the 
purpose of the state. The idea of the state defines the character of the state and its power in the 
international system. The idea establishes legitimacy in the minds of its people. The two main 
sources for the idea of the state are the nation and organising ideologies.113 The nation can be 
characterised as a large group of people sharing the same cultural and possibly the same ethnic or 
racial heritage.114 If the purpose of the state is to protect and express a cultural group, then life and 
culture must come high on the list of national foreign and security priorities. Furthermore, national 
identity is a central component to understanding how Moldova acts in the new post-Soviet 
political space.  
 
Organising ideologies are a higher idea of the state, and are often closely connected to the 
institutional structures of the state. An example of an organising ideology is racial preservation or 
communism. In the case of Moldova, communism was a very strong ideology during the Soviet 
Union, while after independence the ideologies have changed with different leaderships, like in 
the beginning democracy was promoted while now the government is communist. In this way 
none of them has established deeper roots among the population. Since ideologies address the 
bases of relations between government and society, they define the conditions for both harmony 
and conflict in domestic politics. As Moldova is a very new state which is compiled by four 
different ethnic groups, Moldovans, Ukrainians, Russians, Gagauzi, it is difficult to talk about a 
united idea of the state, not to mention a common national identity. This has an important 
influence on the external behaviour of the state. 
 
3.3.2 The institutional expression of the state 
The institutional expression of the state comprises the entire machinery of the government, 
including its executive, legislative and judicial institutions.115 There is close connection between 
the institutional expression of the state and the organising ideology of the state. It is the 
institutions that put the organising ideologies into action, since the institutions have to be 
organised in a specific way in order to express the ideology. The state institutions can to a varying 
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degree compensate for weakness in the idea of the state.116 At the same time institutions can also 
be threatened if they do not have the support of the population and many threats to security come 
from within the state.117 In the case of Moldova the government has been sustained by either the 
Moldovan minority or the Slavic minorities depending on the rhetoric of the government. At the 
same time the secessionist republic of Transnistria constitutes the biggest threat to the existence of 
the Moldovan state.  
 
National and international politics interact with each other and governments have the tendency to 
interfere in each other’s domestic politics as governments largely determine the international 
activity and orientation of states. These interventions can be expressed by propaganda against the 
organising ideology, provision of funds and facilities to opposition groups or external economic 
pressures.118 This situation characterised very well the Russian intervention in the conflict in 
Transnistria where Russia has used all the mentioned tools in order to discredit the Moldovan 
government’s credibility.  
 
3.3.3 The physical base of the state 
The physical base of the state comprises its population and territory, including all of the natural 
resources and man-made wealth contained inside the border, which for instance is technology and 
education.119 One situation where the state’s territory can give rise to insecurities is when a state 
defines its national interests and security in terms of territory and population which are not under 
the control of the state. Moldova’s territory is split at the moment because of the secessionist 
movement in Transnistria. The very weak economy, with most of the heavy industry in 
Transnistria, and the dependency on Russia for gas and oil resources, has weakened the 
government’s possibilities to act in foreign matters. 
 
3.4 Concluding remarks for the theoretical framework 
3.4.1 Critical review of the chosen theories 
The constellation theory’s emphasis on the geopolitical location of each state and on the relational 
and environmental polarity means that one does not get a whole picture of international politics, 
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but a more fragmented one. I see this as an advantage, as the purpose of this thesis is the analysis 
of a particular state’s behaviour and not the overall nature of the international system. The theory 
does have explanatory power in both International Relations and foreign policy fields, although in 
different degrees. That is in contrast to Waltz’ belief that the two fields are separate.  
 
In the beginning of this chapter it was emphasized the idea that, although neoclassical realism has 
contributed with studies on how domestic variables affect foreign policy, they have not been very 
consistent at explaining why some factors are more important than others and have been unable to 
account systematically for the link between international structure and foreign policy. Although 
the constellation theory can also be criticized for having a weak inner logic, it is better at 
explaining the complexity of its assumptions and it explores the general applicability of the theory 
through multiple case studies. It is important to explore the consequences of the interaction 
between materialist (military capabilities, economy, geopolitics) and idealist factors (ideas, 
identity) through theoretical discussion and empirical investigation and the constellation theory 
does that. Although the theory was chosen on the basis of the empirical evidence, the variables of 
analysis have been chosen from the perspective of the theoretical frame. 
 
A critical point of the constellation theory is the exact content of ‘past geopolitics’ that clearly plays 
a crucial role in explaining differences in state behaviour. Past geopolitics is not an objective entity 
that is directly influenced by geopolitical facts, and thus it comes close to ‘identity’120, a concept 
that was criticized by Mouritzen and Wivel for being too circular.121 I do not agree with them, as 
identity is a consequence of geopolitics in the case of Moldova. A foreign policy analysis should 
not restrict itself to one level of explanation. And actually the constellation theory says that 
systemic, regional and the lessons of the past, which are seen at the domestic level, together 
explain foreign policy. But I do not agree that concepts like state, nation and “people” cannot be an 
explanatory factor because they are softer constructivist factors. In fact Mouritzen and Wivel 
combine themselves hard core geopolitics with soft values like “lessons of the past”. The domestic 
level is more than past geopolitics, the actual battle of interests of the elite has a major influence 
and also the actual economic situation influences foreign conduct. The choice of combination of the 
two theories has been made both from a theoretical and an empirical point of view, combining 
inductive and deductive factors.  
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3.4.2 Analytical framework and theoretical expectations to the case of Moldova  
In this thesis a theoretical discussion is combined with an empirical investigation in order to 
explore how the materialist aspects of the world interact with our ideas and perceptions of these 
aspects in the production of foreign policy.122 In order to do this the analysis will be divided into 
three stages that have been generated on the basis of the chosen theories. The analysis will start 
with the Euro-Atlantic level where parsimony is sought and then gradually complexity will be 
added at the near geopolitical and domestic levels in order to get a comprehensive picture. 
 
I have chosen to call the first level of analysis the Euro-Atlantic level as it comprises an analysis of 
the influence of the EU and NATO. It would not be accurate to call this level for systemic 
especially because USA is not analysed. It is rather a level between the system and the unit from 
where the two organisations project their power on Moldova. The two organisations function as an 
institutional superstructure that has important implications for Moldova, no matter what their 
relation to it. Although the EU can also be seen as in the near environment of Moldova, it has a 
special status, as a pole for the whole of Europe, projecting its power through its institutions and 
that is it will be treated separately. The analysis will continue with the near geopolitical constraints 
by looking at the individual constellation in the specific environment of Moldova. In order to do 
that, I have chosen to look at the relation of Moldova with Russia, Romania and Ukraine. Last but 
not least the effect of the present domestic politics will be taken into consideration at the domestic 
level. Although the shadow of the past normally belongs to the domestic level it is a consequence 
of historic events, typically wars of the past, the explanatory level being thus environmental and 
relational as well. As such, the shadow of the past is an important factor at all levels of analysis. 
Furthermore, the variables at the domestic level are seen by NCR as intervening variables. This 
thesis will deal with them as independent variables. This choice is made based on the empirical 
evidence which will show that all three levels of analysis have had equal importance. 
  
It is not easy to make concrete expectations to how Moldova will react in certain situations. As it 
will be shown in the analysis, Moldova has not always acted as one might expect and that is why I 
have chosen to use the theory and my expectations to structure the empirical material. That will 
give me the opportunity to make a thick description of my case while looking at the facts through 
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the theoretical apparatus that chooses what it is important to analyse without making definite 
hypothesis formation.  
 
One expectation in Moldova’s behaviour from my theoretical perspective is that, being an outsider 
to the Euro-Atlantic unipole, it will experience a variable influence-capability towards the Euro-
Atlantic unipole, having a relatively high autonomy. The external behaviour is heterogeneous, 
both bandwagoning and balancing being used when appropriate. Often the behaviour towards the 
Euro-Atlantic unipole is dependent on the attitude of the past hegemon towards the state in 
question. In the case of Moldova the more Russia will show its power e.g. by threatening with 
higher energy prices or with banning the wine import, the more Moldova is expected to turn to the 
EU for protection and trade. 
 
As for the particular constellation of each state, many neighbours and non-pole powers may 
engage in parallel action, meaning similar action patterns and sharing similar identity values and 
most important sharing the main concern, which is the pole’s.  There might be strong incentives to 
cooperate or not due to proximity, but the mutual relationship will be overlaid by pole relations. 
As such both attitudes of cooperation for a common purpose and competition in relation to the 
common power pole can be located.123 For example Moldova and Ukraine share a common history 
and a common hegemon impersonated by Russia, have a common location and parallel foreign 
policies, including EU and NATO approaches. 
 
Another relationship can be one of stability projection which can be projected by a pole of 
attraction, threatening the deprivation of positive incentives, or by a hegemonic power in its 
sphere of interest, threatening with primarily negative incentives. From this theoretical perspective 
one will expect that stability projection from the EU/NATO has not been strong on Moldova. As 
an outsider Moldova has a certain autonomy which the Euro-Atlantic unipole cannot restrain as 
long as it has no positive incentives to offer Moldova. Following the same pattern of thought we 
would expect Moldova’s stability to be more influenced by the neighbouring countries, Romania, 
Russia and Ukraine. They are both in the near environment of Moldova and have a common past. I 
expect Moldova to rely on Romania for a rapprochement towards the Euro-Atlantic unipole while 
trying to avoid conflict with Russia that can help project stability in relation to the Transnistrian 
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conflict. Ukraine is expected to have an influence on Moldova’s aspirations towards the EU and 
NATO. 
 
I would expect the shadow of the past to affect the foreign policy of non-pole powers by inducing 
scepticism towards cooperation with pole powers that have dominated them in the past, but 
enthusiasm towards cooperation with pole powers that may help to free or safeguard them from 
domination. The shadow of the past affects which constellations states are willing to join and how 
they are likely to behave within the constellations.124 Consequently, I expect past history to be 
relevant at all levels of analysis. Buzan’s model of the state will give a comprehensive picture of 
Moldova as a state and how the difference between a strong and a weak state can have a decisive 
influence on foreign policy. I expect that Moldova’s divided national identity and changing 
ideologies will contribute to weaken the decision-makers possibilities to act and inertia will be one 
of the consequences. Remaining in Russia’s sphere of influence will be a dominant tendency as 
changing strategy can bring further loss of popular support and poverty.  
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4. The Euro-Atlantic level 
At the Euro-Atlantic level the relationship with the EU and NATO will be discussed and the role of 
Moldova as an outsider to the two organisations and what it means will be emphasized. The 
polarity around Moldova with Russia on the one side and the EU/NATO on the other constitutes 
a decisive argument in Moldovan foreign behaviour. 
 
As mentioned in the theoretical chapter (Chapter 3), in order to give a comprehensive picture of 
Moldovan foreign policy it will be looked at three levels of analysis. The Euro-Atlantic level is the 
level where parsimony is sought while more complexity will be added at the near geopolitical and 
the domestic levels. The EU and NATO function as an institutional superstructure for non-pole 
powers like Moldova. According to the constellation theory, the EU and NATO project their power 
towards non-pole states differently depending on their affiliation with the two institutions. 
Furthermore, the EU affiliation is the primary factor determining the influence capability and 
action space of European states. Although NATO affiliation is also seen as important, the EU 
covers practically all spheres of societal life, while NATO only focuses on the politico-military 
one.125 As such, we expect Moldova to be more influenced by the EU than by NATO, one of the 
reasons being the country’s neutrality. Consequently, the analysis will place more weight on the 
relationship with the EU. 
 
As an outsider, Moldova is expected to be less influenced by the Euro-Atlantic unipole than 
insiders and would-be insiders are. As membership perspectives are not feasible in the near future, 
the autonomy of these states is quite considerable, not being constrained to accomplish the EU’s 
acquis or NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme. On the other side, their influence-capability is 
also rather weak, depending on factors such as the country’s size (capabilities), local conflict 
patterns or affiliation to other international organisations. 
 
Nevertheless, the outsiders can be influenced in varying degrees economically or culturally by the 
EU and NATO. In the relationship with the EU, it is expected that the weak economy of Moldova 
combined with the troubles from the Transnistrian conflict and the more influence from the great 
power in the near environment, will be the key factors explaining Moldova’s attitude.  
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Being a decentralised power, the pole allows for more active participation and influence of the 
non-pole power than it would if it was centralised. Consequently, there are also less effective 
sanctions from the pole. There are no prescriptions for acceptable foreign policy behaviour, and 
therefore it is difficult for the EU to sanction outsiders like Moldova. However, the EU can project 
its power by economic means, either by providing economic sanctions or market access, 
depending on the actions of the outsiders. Regarding Moldova, the EU has mostly used positive 
incentives to project its power. 
 
As to NATO, I expect the relationship to be much weaker than the one with the EU, as a 
consequence of Moldova being a neutral country. The support from NATO is though important in 
the fight to remove the Russian troops from Transnistria. Just like with the EU, Moldova has a 
great amount of autonomy, but if it wants NATO support, it has to implement at least some of the 
provisions in the Individual Partnership Action Plan.  
   
4.1 Moldova-EU relations  
Moldova can be seen as an outsider in its relationship with the EU, since the prospects for joining 
the EU within the foreseeable future are minimal. Although the EU has cautiously raised the level 
of its incentive for the Europeanization of Moldova, by including it as a first candidate for the New 
Neighbourhood Policy, it has not granted Moldova a membership perspective.126  
 
While Moldovan foreign policy during the mid- and late 1990s was oriented towards Russia, 
Moldovan elites attempted to place the country within a European geography in the hopes of 
stimulating economic links. In 1993 and 1994, President Snegur sent letters to the EU Commission, 
urging the EU to develop a framework for relations with Moldova.127 With the war raging in the 
former Yugoslavia, EU foreign policy was less receptive to formalizing relations with a country 
that had just experienced a civil war.128  
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In 1994, Moldova was among the first NIS (Newly Independent States) to sign a Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the European Union which applied the standard framework 
for cooperation offered to all Soviet successor states.129 In 2001 Moldova was included among the 
sixteen states in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed to enhance relations with 
countries on the EU periphery.130  
 
During the 1990s, neither the EU nor the Moldovan leadership was willing to commit to specific 
actions. 131  The Moldovan leadership’s desire to fully integrate within Europe and the EU was 
limited due to the nature of the domestic political environment. For example, the government of 
Ion Sturza from 1998 declared European integration as its foreign policy priority. However, by late 
1999, the PCRM132 parliamentary group brought down the Sturza government, and Moldova never 
achieved any significant steps towards European integration.133 The division within the Moldovan 
domestic politics reflected a deeper division within the society over the orientation of the country. 
Just as the EU was divided in how to deal with southeastern Europe, Moldovan elites were equally 
divided over whether to pursue a pro-European foreign policy or a pro-Russian one.134  
  
Moldova’s forceful lessons from history, being under the occupation of the Russian Empire/Soviet 
Union for almost all their existence and having a strong Russian-speaking minority, have limited 
the Moldovan balancing of Russia.135 There were basically no others to balance with, as neither the 
EU nor NATO was paying too much attention to the area. At the same time, Russian stability 
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projection managed to stop violence in the Transnistrian conflict quite early in the conflict while 
Euro-Atlantic stability projection was mainly not attempted on outsiders in the 1990s.136 
 
A radical change in the relationship between Moldova and the EU was the polemic around the 
Russian proposal to a solution to the Transnistrian conflict, the so-called Kozak Memorandum. The 
EU High Representative Javier Solana intervened in late November 2003 advising President 
Voronin not to accept the Kozak memorandum, a plan for a constitutional settlement proposed by 
Russia. This proposal would have given the Transnistrian side a de facto veto on constitutional 
changes in Moldova and thus the perpetuation of the Russian military presence for decades.137  
Voronin was forced to back off by pressure from the streets and most important by pressure from 
the United States and the EU. This was a shrewd strategy which ensured his re-election as 
President in April 2005.138  
 
For most of the 1990s Moldova’s strategy was to bandwagon Russia, in this way hoping to reach a 
solution to the Transnistrian conflict. Although Russia has had peacekeeping forces in Transnistria 
since the beginning of the conflict, they have not been able to find a solution to the conflict that 
would satisfy all parts and therefore Moldova has now turned to the EU for help.139 The Moldovan 
president has understood that the EU has much to gain from resolving the conflict in Transnistria 
and that the EU can help Moldova coming out of poverty. Thus he dares to challenge the Russian 
dominance by balancing with the EU.140 
 
The signing of the Action Plan by the EU and Moldova in 2005 is an important step of what 
appears to be Moldova’s intentions towards membership in the EU. The EU-Moldova Action Plan 
outlines detailed changes that must be met on the side of Moldova while it maintains the 
characteristic general and cautionary wording so as to not commit the EU to any significant 
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political or economic costs in the future. However, this document further highlights the 
importance that Moldova has gained in EU policy dealings.141 This point was made clearer by the 
appointment of an EU Special Representative (EUSR) to Moldova in March 2005. Javier Solana said 
that “designating Ambassador Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged (…) is a clear sign of the continuous 
commitment undertaken by the Union to regulate on long-term the conflict in Transnistria”.142 
 
There are several reasons for EU to pay more attention to Moldova. First is the migration issue as, 
after Romania became EU member, half a million Moldovans or more have gained Romanian 
passport and in this way are EU citizens, representing a demographic threat to Moldova and 
possibly to the EU.143 
 
Since the mid-90s Moldovans have been active in the EU job market either legally or illegally, an 
estimated 95 percent of which are employed illegally.144 It is an important factor for the Moldovan 
economy without which it would be difficult for many Moldovans remaining in Moldova to 
live.145 More about that at the domestic level.  
 
Last but not least, Transnistria matters for the EU for several reasons.146 First, the ongoing nature 
of the conflict poses soft security challenges to the enlarged European Union. Illicit trafficking in 
arms, humans and drugs, organised crime, money laundering and smuggling have flourished 
under the authoritarian rule of the Transnistrian leadership.147 Second, Transnistria lies on the 
border of the EU, geographically being the closest unresolved conflict, less than 100 kilometres 
from Romania. Third, the conflict is ‘solvable’. This conflict does not raise the difficult problems of 
inter-ethnic hatred or inter-communal violence seen in other conflicts in the Caucasus.148 Together 
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with the absence of fighting, it gives the EU the chance to forge a strategy that can break the 
political and economic structures sustaining the conflict. The regional dynamics have also changed 
with Ukraine and Romania becoming more positive towards finding a solution.149 Last but not 
least, Transnistria is a locus of tension in the EU-Russia strategic partnership. Addressing this 
conflict would be the first step to building a common space on external security with Russia and 
would set a precedent for EU-Russia cooperation in crisis management.150  
 
Since December 2003, the settlement talks have been blocked, partly because of Russian 
recalcitrance. The EU is not formally included in any of the formally institutionalised conflict 
management formats in Transnistria.151 Rather than seeking to join these formats, the EU has been 
in direct dialogue with the involved actors, in this way bringing an added value to the conflict 
resolution process. This includes active diplomacy by the EUSR for Moldova and the launch of the 
EU Border Assistance Mission.152 The challenge facing the EU now is to seek to relaunch serious 
talks and provide for settlement while finding accommodation with Russia. As the EU has 
admitted, the success of the Action Plan with Moldova depends on the settlement of the conflict.153 
 
In October 2008, Kalman Miszei, the EUSR for Moldova, announced Brussels’ intention to launch 
the mandate for negotiations to establish an updated legal framework for the relations between the 
EU and Moldova.154 In this way it has given a “clear message to Russia by specifying the EU’s 
interests and objectives concerning Eastern Europe”.155 The ultimate goal is to keep Russia from 
gaining influence on Moldova again.156 Many of the EU’s actions point in that direction, like 
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simplifying the visa regime for Moldova. Such facilities would make the Moldovan passport more 
attractive in a situation where Russia keeps making citizenship granting procedures more and 
more flexible.  
 
Furthermore, the Transnistrian conflict has also had an essential impact on the Brussels’s decision 
to consider the possibility of accelerating negotiations on the EU-Moldova agreement. By 
accelerating the process, the EU wants to block Russia’s attempts to influence the Transnistrian 
conflict settlement and to impose the “2+1” format instead of “5+2”.157 Also, Brussels’ attitude may 
be a result of anxiety related to possible foreign re-orientation of Moldova in the context of 
influencing the preferences of the electorate by Russia through prices for energy, mobilization of 
the Russian-speaking electorate etc.158 
 
In this way the EU rewards Moldova for keeping stability at its borders. As an outsider, Moldova 
has in many ways given up some of its autonomy, by adopting parts of the acquis159, in order to 
gain benefits from the EU, like an increase in trade with EU countries as seen in Table 1. Moldova 
benefits from the most favourable preferences available to developing countries under the EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences scheme (GSP).160  
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In return to restricted autonomy, Moldova wants to see some guarantees from the EU that they do 
not do it for nothing. There is always the possibility to turn to Russia and the CIS countries. In this 
way Moldova has the offensive power to influence the EU to do something they would otherwise 
not do.161 One of the major shortcomings of the ENP is the “apparent disproportion between the 
number of commitments and tasks that the neighbours must make and carry out and the benefits 
promised by the EU”.162 The general notion of the document and its lack of prospects for 
membership and other concessions has the potential in turn to paralyze further implementations 
of the ENP.163 
 
Moldovan officials have expressed their intention “to hurry slowly to the EU”, invoking the need 
to have clear prospects of the European cause for Moldova, including signing a document called 
“Association Agreement”.164 At a meeting of the Moldova-European Union Cooperation Council 
in May 2008, Voronin stressed the fact that the new agreement with the EU shall clearly stipulate 
its EU membership perspective as it would “encourage a qualitative and lasting development of 
our relations with the EU”, even though Moldovan authorities do not have any plans to seek clear 
accession terms.165  
 
On the other hand, Moldova’s autonomy can be seen in a number of issues that it “delays” to solve 
like corruption, trafficking in human beings and reforms in economy and justice.166 Instead of 
defending his country, the head of Moldovan Foreign Affairs has expressed his indignation over 
the fact that the EU would not have used all the possibilities to support the European aspirations 
of Moldova, making allusions to Brussels’ assurances with regard to Moldova’s European 
future.167 Furthermore the shift in external trade towards the EU has been slow and disappointing, 
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one of the most important reasons being, according to a World Bank study, barriers stemming 
from domestic policies and laws rather than the EU.168 
 
4.1.1 Summary of Moldova-EU relations 
As expected, Moldova’s relation with the EU has been a distant one considering the outsider role 
of the country. As membership is not an option in the near future, the autonomy of Moldova has 
been extensive. Nevertheless, the EU has been able to influence Moldova with regard to economic 
reforms and by impending it to sign the Kozak Memorandum, a solution to the Transnistrian 
conflict which would have been more favourable to Russian interests than to Moldovan or EU 
ones. Moldova has mostly used a strategy of bandwagoning towards the EU in situations where it 
has seen an advantage in doing that; however, being careful not to “upset” the great power Russia, 
which still has a greater influence in the region.  
 
4.2 Moldova-NATO relations 
The Constitution of Moldova was adopted in 1994 and stipulates the permanent neutrality of the 
country and the interdiction of foreign armed forces on her territory. 169 Furthermore, in 1995, the 
National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine and the Foreign Policy Concept were adopted, all 
mentioning permanent neutrality as stipulated in the Constitution and considering it a cornerstone 
for the foreign, military and security concepts.170 
 
At that time, it seemed to be a wise option for at least two reasons. First, the new state did not have 
a military history at all, so permanent neutrality was seen as a substitute for a strong army (Table 
2). It was the cheapest and most convenient means to defend its sovereignty and independence. 
Permanent neutrality can be seen as the strategy to survive between two stronger neighbours and 
as a response to Russia’s pressures to include Moldova in various security designs. Second, the 
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presence of Russian troops on the left bank of the Nistru171 River was also a reason for being 
neutral as the constitutional provision served as an additional argument for the withdrawal of the 
Russian soldiers and military equipment from the Moldovan territory.172  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The geopolitical significance of the Moldovan neutrality became evident after the North Atlantic 
Alliance’s decision on its enlargement towards Eastern Europe. For Romania and Bulgaria who 
sought NATO membership, Moldova’s neutral status, followed by the withdrawal of the foreign 
troops from its sovereign territory was surely more acceptable than its integration into the CIS 
military structure. Taking into consideration an eventual use of the 14th Army173, western oriented 
Ukraine has also supported the Moldovan neutrality.174 
 
NATO extension towards Eastern Europe has become an argument used by both Moscow and 
Tiraspol175 to sustain the Russian troops’ stationing in Transnistria.176 Thus, Russian State Duma 
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has rejected the ratification of the 1990 Moldovan-Russian Treaty of friendship and co-operation 
and has pleaded against the Russian troops’ withdrawal from Moldova, because, in its opinion, 
these are necessary to counteract the NATO expansion towards East.177 
 
Despite its commitment to permanent neutrality, Moldova joined the Partnership for Peace 
Programme on 16 of March 1994. Moldova’s avowed interest in participating in the PfP process 
was the strengthening of political dialogue and practical cooperation with NATO as a means of 
enhancing Moldova’s security, modernizing and reforming the country’s defence system in 
keeping with Euro Atlantic standards and enhancing Moldovan capacities for participation in 
peacekeeping operations. On July 6, 2006, the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) Republic 
of Moldova-NATO was approved by the Government.178 The document states that the 
implementation of the IPAP does not mean that Moldova aims to join NATO, but only strives to 
reform the military and security sectors.179 
 
NATO has not shown much interest in Moldova, considering it to be in the influence sphere of 
Russia and being occupied by the enlargement with Central and Eastern European countries. But 
at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, Moldova was mentioned for the first time in a separate article of 
the Istanbul Communiqué.180 One important conclusion of NATO’s Istanbul Summit concerned 
the provisions of the adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as a cornerstone of 
European security, specifically the “Istanbul Commitments” approved at the OSCE’s Istanbul 
Forum in 1999. One of the commitments specified an unconditional withdrawal of all Russian 
troops from Moldova’s Transnistria region and liquidation of the stock of Russian-supplied 
combat hardware and munitions deployed to Transnistrian secessionist forces.181 None of these 
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Europe, March 12, 2004 and “Who’s Hanging Tough in NATO?”, The Wall Street Journal Europe, May 28-30 2004, 
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provisions has been implemented, and this issue provoked sharp debates and criticisms in Istanbul 
regarding Russia’s reluctance to fulfil its obligations. 
 
This gave the Moldovan president Vladimir Voronin the courage to balance Russia with NATO 
knowing how important Moldovan neutrality is for Russia. At the Istanbul Summit, he stressed 
that “complete and unconditional implementation of the Istanbul 1999 OSCE decisions regarding 
withdrawal of foreign troops and ammunitions from Moldova is the most important condition for 
the improving of the situation in the eastern part of the country”.182 Along with the surprising 
three-hour visit to Chisinau183 of U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld – the highest-ranking 
U.S. official to visit Moldova – this was a clear sign that finally something was happening that 
could lead to a thaw in the Transnistrian conflict. Not much has happened since. 
 
Neutrality of Moldova may be considered a strategy for better accomplishing the national 
interests, which at the moment are determined by the constellation around Moldova, with EU and 
NATO members in the West and Russia in the East.184 For the analyst Vladimir Socor, Moldova’s 
neutrality seems more an invention of the Russian Federation that would like to have guarantees 
that Moldova would not join NATO in the future.185 The neutrality of Moldova can in the end 
prove to be more expensive than joining a strong military alliance, which would provide more 
security for Moldova. The problem is that Moldova cannot increase its security and military 
capabilities and at the same time, take into account a possible NATO membership, as long as the 
Russian military is present in Transnistria and as long as the conflict remains unsettled.186 
 
Taking into account the current geopolitical situation in Europe, especially the NATO-Russia 
relations regarding the Alliance’s enlargement to the East in the near and medium future, the 
Republic of Moldova can maintain its political independence only as a neutral state, having an 
equidistant position towards the political-military bodies of the West and the CIS. On the one 
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hand, Moldova’s adherence to NATO is not a real solution.187 Moreover, Chisinau’s tentative to 
promote a course of integration into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance could justify Russia’s pressure, 
including military, on the Moldovan State. On the other hand, Moldova’s adherence to the Eastern 
political-military structures would finally lead to a voluntary renunciation of the state 
independence.188 
 
The only alternative for Moldova at the moment is the rapprochement towards the EU, which first, 
serves Moldovan interests better than NATO, as the EU has a more inclusive character, gaining 
economic and social advantages rather than only security ones. Second, the EU has more interests 
in Moldova than NATO has, as the EU is directly influenced by conditions in Moldova. Third, 
Russia is more inclined to accept the EU’s influence on Moldova as it also needs the EU for its 
energy delivery and because the EU does not pose any security threat to Russia as NATO does.  
Furthermore, NATO is not a real alternative for Moldova at the moment as Moldova is a neutral 
country and NATO has also stronger incentives to keep its relationship with Russia on a friendly 
tone than protecting the Moldovan interests. 
 
4.2.1 Summary of Moldova-NATO relations 
As the theory predicted, NATO has a weak influence on Moldova, mostly because Moldova finds 
itself in the Russian sphere of influence and NATO would rather keep good relations with Russia 
than help Moldova keep territorial integrity. Some progress has been made by signing the IPAP 
Programme but Moldova has not been too keen at complying with its wording as it cannot see any 
real advantage.  
 
4.3 Concluding remarks for the Euro-Atlantic level 
The Euro-Atlantic level has helped explain the frame conditions for the events that play out at the 
regional and the domestic levels. At this level it has been looked at Moldova’s relation with the 
Euro-Atlantic unipole and how it has influenced the country’s external behaviour. We have seen 
that the outsider role of Moldova to both the EU and NATO has both given them autonomy and 
restraint. But this is only one facet of foreign policy. The relationship with the two organisations 
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only gives a partial picture and we need to look at the close environment and internal conditions 
to see the whole image.   
 
Moldova has a very weak influence on the international scene, the two institutions being too far 
away and too strong for Moldova to really challenge them. Moldova can gain some advantages by 
accomplishing with some of the EU and NATO requests. It has been shown that the EU is only 
invited to get involved in the solution of the Transnistrian conflict when it suits the Moldovan 
interests best. Nevertheless, there have been instances when the Euro-Atlantic unipole has 
intervened with the result that Moldova has complied with the West’s requests. When Moldova 
has seen support from the NATO allies, it has also dared to balance Russia by requesting the 
unconditioned withdrawal of troops from Transnistria. 
 
It seems that the actions undertaken by the Communist government towards Europeanization, 
which are in many ways contrary to the Communist ideals, have been a tactical manoeuvre in 
order to politically survive and ensure the re-election in the 2009 parliamentary elections. This 
rapprochement is due to the favourable geopolitical considerations of the EU and European 
Neighbourhood Policy opposed to the aggressive policy Russia is trying to promote in its “near 
abroad”.189 
 
As for the relationship with NATO, Moldova has declared itself a neutral country since 1994. 
Therefore, Moldova has a strong autonomy towards NATO. The advantages from its relation with 
NATO have not been many. The Russian troops continue to station on the territory of the Republic 
of Moldova against NATO’s request of withdrawal. Consequently, the great power Russia has 
more to say in Moldovan affairs than international organisations do because it is closer to the 
geopolitical environment of Moldova. 
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5. The near geopolitical level 
The near geopolitical level is the level with most explanatory power according to the theoretical 
provisions. According to the constellation theory the near geopolitical environment around 
Moldova should explain a great deal of the conduct in her foreign policy.190 As such, geopolitics is 
the independent variable with the strongest explanatory power. Based on empirical evidence, I 
have chosen to look at the relation of Moldova with Russia, Romania and Ukraine. Both present 
and past geopolitics are important and we would expect Russia, as the closest super power to have 
the strongest influence on Moldova’s foreign policy. Romania represents the Euro-Atlantic unipole 
in the region and is expected to support Moldova in her wish to come close to the EU and NATO. 
It does project some power on Moldova in terms of support for the EU and NATO membership 
and trade relations but their common turbulent past has not been beneficent for the relationship of 
the two countries. Ukraine has the same goal of being a part of the Euro-Atlantic unipole and as 
such is expected to willingly help Moldova make progress both economically and politically 
particularly with regard to the conflict in Transnistria, which borders Ukraine.  
 
Moldova’s relational polarity can be seen as multipolarity with some pole powers having more 
influence than others. Moldova is expected to conduct a policy of bandwagoning towards Russia 
in the 1990s when Russia was the most powerful pole in the region. After the EU has become more 
involved in the region, Romania and Ukraine have gained importance. It is further anticipated that 
the relationship to these countries in the near environment is more important for Moldova as a 
weak state, than the relationship to the Euro-Atlantic pole, where Moldova is an outsider.191 This is 
because as an outsider to the EU, Moldova has fewer benefits than from bilateral relations with its 
neighbouring countries. However, the closer the EU comes to Moldova’s near environment, the 
more significance the EU has in Moldova’s foreign behaviour. As mentioned in the theory chapter 
(Chapter 3) the historical legacy is expected to be an important factor at all levels of analysis, not 
only at the domestic level, as the constellation theory predicts. Moldova has been a part of Russia, 
Romania and Ukraine at a particular moment in the past and is dependent on them for different 
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political, economical and cultural reasons. I anticipate this to be reflected in Moldova’s attitude 
towards these countries.192 
5.1 Moldova-Russia relations  
As mentioned above, Russia is expected to have the strongest influence on Moldova among the 
three countries analysed here. This is due to, in terms of present geopolitics, Moldova being 
dependent on Russia concerning its economy, especially energy policy, and the resolution of the 
Transnistrian conflict. Furthermore the Russian minority plays a dominant role on the political 
stage in both Moldova and Transnistria promoting Russian interests. As long as Russia wishes to 
keep Moldova in its sphere of influence, Moldova will have difficulties avoiding Russia’s 
domination. Russia’s interests in Moldova can be linked to the country’s quest at bringing itself to 
the heights of a 21st century world power, as stated by Kremlin’s consultant Gleb Pavlovsky during 
a press conference in 2005 when he said that, “one should be aware that, at least until the end of 
President Putin’s tenure and probably until the end of the presidency of his immediate successors, 
Russia’s foreign policy priority will be to turn Russia into a 21st century world power”.193 Moldova 
is, however, just a “minor irritation on its ‘traditional periphery’, not as problematic as Ukraine, 
Chechnya or the Caucasus, but in the same basket of troubles”.194 Moldova has become an 
increased and growing priority for Russia especially after “the Ukrainian Orange revolution broke 
the proverbial camels back”.195 In addition, “thanks to Cold War habits of mind, Russia’s interest 
in hegemony over Moldova [has] increased noticeably [since] Romania joined NATO”196 and now 
the EU.  
 
Accordingly, Moldova is expected to balance between the two power poles, Russia and the Euro-
Atlantic pole, mostly the EU, and not provoke high tensions in its own salient environment. In the 
1990s Moldova bandwagoned Russia that was the most powerful pole in the region. As soon as the 
balance of power changed towards the EU, Moldova abandoned its attitude of non-provocation 
and bandwagoned the EU, while careful not to provoke Russia.    
 
                                                 
192 King, Charles (2000): The Moldovans. Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture, Stanford University: Hoover 
Institution Press, pp. 1-7. 
193 Socor, Vladimir (2005): “Kremlin Redefining Policy in ‘post-Soviet’ space, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Washington 
DC.: Jamestown Foundation, vol.2, issue 27, accessed 27.12.2008 at: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=27502&tx_ttnews[backPid]=176&no_cache=1  
194 Ibid.  
195 Villarroel (2005): p. 45. 
196  Smith (2005b): p. 7. 
 54
After independence, Moldova oriented its foreign policy towards Romania and the nationalist 
feeling of getting reunited with the other Romanian historical provinces was very strong. As a 
consequence the Russian-speaking population felt there was the danger of Moldova reuniting with 
Romania and thus the conflict in Transnistria started in 1990. During the two years that the armed 
conflict lasted, Russia was not neutral in deeds as it was in speech, as the Russian 14th Army which 
had its headquarters in Transnistria, helped the rebels keep the Moldovan troops out of 
Transnistria.197 The civil war had an immediate impact on Moldovan domestic politics and in July 
1992 almost all members of the pro-Romanian government resigned.198  
 
The political fallout from the civil war continued throughout the 1990s and forced a reorientation 
in Moldovan foreign policies away from Romania and towards Russia. In the 1994 parliamentary 
elections, the Democratic Agrarian Party, a party of former nomenklatura199, captured an absolute 
majority of seats. Together with President Snegur, they promoted foreign-policy realignment with 
Russia while relations with Romania and much of Europe stagnated.200 In April 1994, Moldova 
joined the CIS, although not the military component of the organisation, invoking its status of 
neutrality.201 The foreign policy orientation towards Russia during the 1990s is not surprising 
given Moldova’s dependence on Russia for several reasons. First of all powerful political factors, 
like an influential minority, politically and economically active202, then cultural elements as the 
dominant role played by the Russian language and culture in the Soviet Union and afterwards.203 
Last but not least, economic links like import/export trade and dependency on gas and electricity 
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media from Russia, supported with stronger financial incentives as opposed to Romania, makes the competition 
between the two languages fairly unfair. See Vitu (2004): p. 19-20. 
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imports from Russia204, and military reasons such as the illegal presence of Russian troops on 
Moldova’s territory since 1992 until this moment205. The economic and military factors are the 
most important ones and they will be commented on more thoroughly beneath.  
 
In the 1990s Russia was Moldova’s largest export market by a significant margin. Especially after 
the 1996 election of pro-Russian President Petru Lucinschi, Moldovan exports to Russia continued 
to be very high until the Russian economic collapse of 1998.206 Although Moldovan economic 
relations with Russia have deteriorated, Russia is still the largest export country for Moldovan 
products. (Table 3) Furthermore, imports from Russia are significant, especially in the energy 
sector, where Moldova is totally dependent of Gazprom.207 (Table 4) Russia has significantly 
increased the price of gas exports to Moldova208 (Table 5) and in April 2006, the country banned 
Moldovan wine imports, for supposed health reasons.209 After the import ban, President Voronin 
announced that Moldova would reorient its wine exports to the EU as well as China.210  
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       Table 3: Gas prices paid to Russia by Ukraine,  
        Moldova and Belarus in 2005-2007 (in USD) 
 2005 2006 2007 
Ukraine 50 95 130 
Moldova 80 110-160 170 
Belarus  47 47 100 
Source: Gromadzki, Grzegorz (2007): Energy Game. 
Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus between the EU and Russia, 
Warsaw: Stefan Batory Foundation.
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Table 3: Moldovan export to Russia (1st place) and Romania (2nd place) 
Export total 100 % 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2 2 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Russia 58.2 53.3 41.3  44.5 43.6 37.1 39 35.8 31.8 17.3 17.3
Romania 6.73 9.6 8.8 8 6.7 8.8 11.4 10 10.2 14.7 15.7
Source: Based on figures from the National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova 
http://www.statistica.md/category.php?l=en&idc=336& 
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In addition to the economic links, the continuing presence of Russian troops on Moldovan soil 
provided another important source of Russian leverage over Moldovan foreign policy. The 
agreement to withdraw all Russian forces was initially signed in 1994, and while there are fewer 
than 1.500 troops remaining by 2008, there is still a massive amount of ammunition and equipment 
in Transnistria.211 The main problem is that the status of these forces has not changed 
fundamentally since 1995. Moldova’s dependency on Russian energy and the Russian market 
limited the country’s ability to resolve the status of these forces or press for a conclusion to a basic 
treaty.212 Thus, the Russian commitment in the OSCE Istanbul Declaration to remove all forces 
from Moldova by the end of 2002 was viewed as a significant development. In the Istanbul 
Declaration, Moscow committed to remove its forces without any conditions and without any 
connection to resolving Transnistria’s status. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has since 
                                                 
211 40.000 to 50.000 of arms and ammunition would have remained in Transnistria after the USSR breakdown. See 
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Table 4: Consumption and import of gas from Russia 
 
Year/billion m3 2007 
Consumption  2.44  
Import Gazprom* 2.44/2.7
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consistently argued, however, that a military withdrawal must coincide with a political agreement 
on Transnistria.213 
 
As the theory predicted, Russia has used both positive and negative incentives to keep Moldova in 
its sphere of influence. In the 1990s by having extensive economic trade and by projecting stability 
in Transnistria, while after Voronin’s turn to the West, by economic sanctions and the refuse to 
withdraw the Russian troops from Transnistria. 
 
In the late 1990s there were some attempts to reorient foreign interests towards the European 
Union but it didn’t last long and after the elections in 2001, a communist government conducted 
by Vladimir Voronin was installed in power. Voronin declared its aim of, once again, approaching 
Russia saying that Moldova will be present where its national interests lie, especially in Russia and 
the CIS.214 Voronin expressed wishes like joining the Russian-Belarusian union and having Russia 
take a key position in solving the Transnistria conundrum. Furthermore, he advocated the use of 
Russian as an official state language. After assuming office, Voronin said “Russia and Moldova 
synchronize their steps on major issues of foreign policy”.215 With this sharper Eastern 
reorientation towards Moscow, Voronin hoped it would result in more effective Russian mediation 
of Transnistria’s reintegration into Moldova.216  
 
However, by 2004, there was still no resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. The OSCE had 
unsuccessfully tried to resolve the issue for more than a decade after the United Nations turned 
the problem over. The OSCE supported a federal solution to the reintegration of Moldova, as did 
the United States in 2003-04. In October 2003, the U.S. ambassador to Moldova, Pamela Hyde 
Smith, said that "The federal solution is the only effective plan launched in the last ten years."217 
The basic problem was to figure out how to divide the powers between the central government 
                                                 
213 See Radio Free Europe (15 April 2004): “Russian Deputy Chief of Staff Blames Moldova for Transdniester 
Evacuation Halt”, accessed 30.1208 at http://www.rferl.org/content/Article/1143138.html 
214 “Communists win in Moldova” (21 February 2001), BBC News, accessed 12.09.08 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1190180.stm   
215 See “Moldovan President Says Foreign Policy coordinated with Russia” (20 November 2001), ITAR-TASS (in 
English), accessed 12.09.08 at http://nl.newsbank.com  
216 Popescu, Nicu (2006): “’Outsourcing’ de facto Statehood. Russia and the Secessionist Entities in Georgia and 
Moldova”, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 109, July 2006, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, accessed 12.09.08 at 
www.ceps.be, p. 2. 
217 Quoted in Wiener, Robert (2004): ”The Foreign Policy of the Voronin Administration”, Demokratizatsiya –The 
Journal of Post- Soviet Democratization, Washington DC.: Heldref Publications, accessed 29.12.08 at 
http://www.demokratizatsiya.org/html/TOCS.html, p. 5.  
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and Transnistria and Gagauzia218. See figure 2 for the regions of Moldova. Moldova favoured an 
asymmetrical federation in which power would be concentrated in the central government. Igor 
Smirnov, the “leader” of Transnistria, favoured a federal solution in which power would be 
equally divided - a confederation rather than a federation.219 In November 2003, Voronin seemed 
prepared to sign a Russian-sponsored settlement ("Basic Principles of the State Structure of a 
United State"), as spelled out in a memorandum presented by Dmitry Kozak, the deputy chief of 
staff to the Russian president.220 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
218 Gagauzia is an autonomous region of Moldova. Its name derives from the word "Gagauz", which in turn derived 
from the name Gok-oguz used to describe descendants of the Turkic Oghuz tribe. Accessed 29.12.08 at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gagauzia  
219 Wiener (2004): p. 6. 
220 For the text of the Kozak Memorandum, see "Russian Draft Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State 
Structure of a United State in Moldova (Kozak Memorandum)," accessed 30.12.08 at 
http://eurojournal.org/comments.php?id=P107_0_1_0_C  
         Figure 2: Map of Moldova including the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia 
 
           Source: www.moldova.org  
         Figure 1: Map over Moldova and the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia 
 
           Source: www. ldova.org  
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Before Voronin could sign the Kozak Memorandum, there was a firestorm of protests by 
opposition political forces in Moldova. They formed the National Committee to Defend Moldova's 
Independence and Constitution in opposition to the plan contained in the Kozak Memorandum, as 
a majority of Moldovans were opposed to federalization.221 Important external actors, such as the 
United States, the European Union, and the OSCE also expressed their opposition to the Kozak 
Memorandum.222 Opponents of the Russian plan argued that, if accepted, it would have resulted 
in the "Transnistriazation" of Moldova.223 The plan would have transformed Moldova into a 
Russian protectorate, since Russia would have possibly been the sole military guarantor, with its 
troops staying up to twenty years in Moldova. The political system outlined in the Kozak 
Memorandum would have given Transnistria a veto over decisions reached in the new federal 
structure and recognized Transnistrian sovereignty.224 The internal opposition combined with 
pressure from the United States225, the European Union, and the OSCE, forced Voronin to cancel 
his earlier intention to sign the Kozak Memorandum. 
 
The failure of Voronin to sign the Kozak Memorandum resulted in the first serious breach in 
Russian-Moldovan relations since Voronin assumed office in 2001. Russian officials used very 
strong language reprimanding Voronin.226 Voronin explained that although the Russian plan was 
a good one, it was necessary to consult with the European organizations before signing on to it, 
since Moldova was a European state.227 The EU may have interpreted this to mean that Moldova 
had replaced its eastern orientation with a European orientation. Nevertheless, Moldova was 
simply continuing to pursue its national interest through a policy of balance of power, not jumping 
on the European Union bandwagon but signalling Russia that Moldova might turn to 
bandwagoning the EU if Russia did not help with a solution in the Transnistrian conflict. In early 
January 2004, Voronin stressed that a solution would not be feasible without the Russians, but also 
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pointed out that "there are certain forces in Russia that are not interested in solving the 
problem."228 After Voronin's refused to sign the Kozak Memorandum, Russian withdrawal of 
material supposedly halted because of the obstruction by the Transnistrian authorities.229  
 
By orienting his foreign policy towards Russia, Voronin had hoped to get financial concessions 
and strong stand against Transnistria.230 But he was disappointed. All along the Russians have 
been hard bargainers over gas debt rescheduling, have insisted that Moldova repay their energy 
debts in cash or equity equivalent to avoid creating a precedent for other CIS states, and have 
acted in Russia's best interest in Transnistria.231 Consequently, for these and other reasons, over the 
past five years, Voronin has been much more willing to integrate closely with the West, as shown 
by his policy of trying to gain eventual EU accession and his acquiescence to some of the PACE232 
resolutions. Ultimately, Voronin's foreign policy is based on what he sees as being best for 
Moldova, for maintaining the PCRM's overwhelming control of power, and for Voronin.233  
 
Relations between Moldova and Russia degraded considerably when Voronin refused to sign the 
memorandum. After the victory of the Communist Party in the parliamentary elections in May 
2005, the Moldova-Russia relations deteriorated further when Russia stopped the import of crop 
and meat products from Moldova. In 2006, a ban on import of Moldovan wines followed, putting 
the economy of the country in a very difficult situation.234 Furthermore negotiations around the 
Transnistrian issue were also stalled. In August 2006 Putin and Voronin met in an attempt to 
normalise relations but nothing new came out of this meeting.235    
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Despite the meeting of the presidents, there has not been any further noticeable change in the 
relations between Moldova and Russia for the past two years. As events in Kosovo and Georgia 
developed in 2008, Moldova sought to portray itself as more moderate and reasonable than Tbilisi. 
Moldova did not recognize Kosovo, emphasized the neutrality of the country, and ostentatiously 
announced that it had no need to seek NATO membership.236 Chisinau237 was rewarded in March 
2008, when the Russian Parliament advocated recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, but recommended only a special status for Transnistria within Moldova.238 On August 
the 25, Russian president Medvedev met with Voronin in Sochi239 and reaffirmed Russia’s 
dedication to seeking a peaceful resolution to the Transnistrian conflict. Voronin seemed again to 
be more favourable towards the Russian mediation and he told Medvedev that he had learned the 
lesson: “Thank God, during all these years ... we had enough brains and reserve not to allow a 
similar [the Georgian conflict] deterioration of situation.”240    
 
Although Voronin’s rhetoric has been more violent against the Russian dominance in Transnistria, 
it does not seem that President Voronin has learned any lesson, as he is still trying to get a solution 
in place on the Russian premises.241 As emphasised in the theory chapter, historical analogy is 
often used by decision-makers in order to justify their actions. Previous decisions or existing 
routines have a strong power when “similar” situations are being faced.242 In the case of Moldova, 
Voronin’s attitude is determined by the common communist past with Russia and the 
remembrance of the “good old days” when the Russian bureaucrats enjoyed many favours but 
also knew that lack of compliance would lead to sanctions. Besides, Voronin thought it would be 
easier to deal with Russia as it is a power he knows. Unfortunately, analogies often lead to failure 
as decision-makers are blind for the special circumstances that surround the actual situation.243 
 
Within the last two years, the media has talked about a “package agreement” between Chisinau 
and Moscow. This time, though, the final approval of this unseen agreement should take place in 
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the 5+2 format. Not many have seen the final version of this agreement, but according to the 
Moldovan expert Oazu Nantoi, it comes down to the fact that “the Kremlin can get more from 
Chisinau by ceding the ‘Transnistrian pawn’ than by supporting the regime run by the Russian 
puppet Igor Smirnov”.244  
 
Nevertheless, not much has happened since. Russia has tried to get the two parties to meet but 
Smirnov has invoked several excuses not to meet with Voronin.245 Finally, the parties met on 
December 24 2008 in Tiraspol246 where Voronin presented Smirnov with a package of propositions 
which envisaged the status of Transnistria as an autonomous republic.247 Two days after the 
meeting, at a press conference, the Transnistrian ‘President’ declared that no solution to the 
Transnistrian conflict was possible without the recognition of the republic’s independence by 
Moldova.248 So, back to square one.    
 
5.1.1 Summary of Moldova-Russia relations 
As expected, Moldova chose, in the 1990s, to bandwagon Russia due to the relative strong 
capabilities that Russia possesses in the region and Moldova's total dependency on economic trade 
with Russia. From the second period of Voronin’s presidency, Moldova changed its strategy 
towards bandwagoning the EU and NATO.  The initial extremely cautious rhetoric was replaced 
by less cautious formulations, as the power trend shifted. This is due to several reasons such as, 
the intervening of the Euro-Atlantic unipole in the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict by 
refraining Moldova to sign the Kozak memorandum as it saw that as a threat to safeguarding the 
borders to the Euro-Atlantic unipole. Furthermore, inaction from Russia’s part in solving the 
conflict and domestic opposition contributed to that. EU’s involvement in the conflict is also due to 
Voronin’s pro-Europe attitude and the concessions he made concerning PACE resolutions. Thus, 
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Moldova was already rewarded in 2001 by the inclusion in the ENP programme and in 2005 the 
EU and Moldova signed the Individual Action Plan. 
 
At the same time, Russia has also projected its power through positive and negative incentives, 
mostly by negative incentives such as cutting gas supplies and refusing to handle Moldovan wine. 
As expected, Moldova has been inclined to be more sensitive to the power influence of the nearest 
power pole than to the Euro-Atlantic unipole. As an outsider to the Euro-Atlantic unipole, 
Moldova does not have to submit itself to the two institutions’ reforms as the prospects of gaining 
membership are very distant. Conclusively, doe to its position between two power poles Moldova 
is forced to balance between the two depending on the shifting in the balance of power. 
 
5.2 Moldova-Romania relations 
The relationship with Romania is important for the reason that they have a shared past and 
because Romania is a member of both the EU and NATO. This has been a help for the 
reorientation of Moldova’s foreign policy towards the West, in the context of the change in the 
geopolitical situation with both the EU and NATO showing more interest in solving the conflict in 
Transnistria. Romania is expected to have an increasing role as a trade partner, as Moldova’s trade 
with the CIS countries is decreasing.  
 
Following the Hitler-Stalin understanding, the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939, and the 
subsequent Soviet annexation in 1940 of the “sacred” Romanian territories of Bessarabia and 
Bukovina249, the frontier between Romania and Soviet Moldova remained sealed for 50 years.  
Soviet Moldova and Socialist Romania barely cooperated during the era of communist regimes.  
The linguistic and ethnic policies of Russia in Moldova were shaped in a way which supported the 
policy of the building of a distinct Moldovan nation different from the Romanian one. Aware of 
the strong pro-Romanian sentiments of the population in Moldova, Moscow drastically limited 
and controlled cross-border economic and cultural contacts.250   
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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moldova faced two options: unity with Romania or 
independence while cultivating strong ties with Russia under the umbrella of CIS. In the period 
immediately after its independence, Moldova looked towards Bucharest and the country’s 
linguistic law recognized “Moldovan-Romanian linguistic identity”.251 But when Moldova openly 
made its strategic move towards Moscow, relations with Bucharest worsened.252  
 
One of the reasons for this turn towards Moscow was Romania’s lack of interest in becoming 
“Great Romania” again. Actually, Romania was one of the first countries to recognize the 
independence of the new state.253 First of all, Romania was nearly as poor as Moldova and the 
economic burden of 5 million people would not have eased the democratic development of any of 
the two countries.254 Besides, Romanians had mixed feelings about Moldovans and vice versa. 
Many Romanians see the Moldovans as "Russified" and hold the condescending view that they are 
in need of assistance to overcome their cultural disabilities. This has been a source of growing 
resentment among the majority of Moldovans.255 Thus, Moldova chose to bandwagon Russia 
because it was the strongest and safest power pole in the region in the 1990s.  
 
On the other side, Moldova realised that Romania wanted to keep good relations with Moscow 
and would not be able to support them especially when Russia gave clear signals that they wanted 
Moldova to remain in their sphere of influence.256 Last but not least, Moldovan political elites did 
not want to share power with Bucharest. Here we notice the analogy the political elites made 
between being a part of Romania and being a part of the Soviet Union when everything was 
dictated from Moscow.257 In this new context, it became important to reaffirm Moldovan 
separateness. The Moldovan Constitution declared that the national language of the Republic of 
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Moldova is Moldovan.258 Fully integrated into the CIS economic system, Moldova did not consider 
other alternatives in foreign affairs for more than a decade.259 
 
Consequently, in spite of the special historical relations, Romania’s and Moldova’s post-
communist development has been undermined by tensions, which did not permit the conclusion 
of a bilateral political treaty for more than eight years. The two countries were unable to complete 
the draft document mainly because of Romania’s insistence that the treaty should include a clause 
denouncing the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov pact which forced Romania to cede the province of 
Bessarabia to the Soviet Union. 260   
 
In the late 1990s, being preoccupied with its objectives of integration into the European Union and 
NATO, Romania seemed to neglect relations with Moldova. However, important measures of the 
government and civil society contributed to the rapprochement of Romania and Moldova in this 
period. The Bucharest government helped Moldova with non-reimbursable electric power, fuel 
and grain. At the same time many Moldovans came to study at Romanian universities.261  
After Voronin came to power, the relations between Moldova and Romania became even more 
tensed as the Moldovan government proposed, at the end of 2001, replacing the study of the 
history of Romania with that of the history of Moldova and making the Russian language 
compulsory.262  
 
The Romanian government was, predictably, critical of the PCRM decision to make Russian 
language instruction compulsory. The Romanian Foreign Ministry called the decision “political 
interference in education and culture meant to give the Russian language a privileged status.”263 
The poor historical relationship between the two countries contributed to a concern among 
Moldovan-speakers that, eventually, the country would revert to a pre-1989 status quo in which 
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Russian was the dominant and preferred language of communication. This fear, combined with 
imminent EU restrictions on Moldovan travel, created a huge demand for Romanian passports.264 
In 2001, the EU pressured the Romanian government to require an international passport for all 
Moldovan travellers.  Moldovans began to worry that the Romanian border would once again be 
closed to them and began to apply for Romanian citizenship.265 This complies with the theoretical 
prediction that EU power projection is strong in the relation between a would-be insider which 
Romania was at that time, and an outsider.266 
 
But after 2003, Voronin understood that Romania would be a help in the process of European 
integration. Moldova declared in 2005 it wanted to make the most of its “special relationship” with 
Romania, which was to become its interior voice and supporter in Brussels.267 Traian Basescu, 
which was elected Romanian president in 2004, also declared his support for Moldova’s European 
integration. 268 However, after a period of stability, new tensions arose and culminated during 
2007. Chisinau accused the government of Romania of “undermining Moldova’s independence”. 
One of the main accusations was that Romania did not recognize the Moldovan language as 
distinctive from the Romanian language.269 
 
The Moldovan opposition leader, Iulie Rosca, stated that these declarations were a part of the 
coordinated policies of Moscow that does not want to lose influence over Moldova and intends to 
keep Moldova as far as possible from NATO and the EU, including from Romania.270 This chill in 
Romanian-Moldovan relations coincides with a decisive thaw in relations between Chisinau and 
Moscow, following Russia’s announcement on 29 November 2006 that it would end the economic 
blockade on Moldovan wine. Hence, President Voronin’s declaration with regard to Romania 
issued two days after the end of the Russian blockade can by no means be interpreted as an 
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isolated gesture.271 This is not the first time when Romania has been obstructed by Russia to have 
an influence in Moldova. At the moment, Romania has no significant role in the conflict in 
Transnistria. In 1997 Russia and Ukraine declared themselves as “guarantor countries” in order to 
exclude the West and Romania from a meaningful role.272 This shows how strong a power 
projection Russia has on Moldova. 
 
In 2008 Moldova’s president showed again a friendly attitude following the Russian war in 
Georgia and the NATO summit in Bucharest in the fall 2008.Voronin said that he wanted good 
relations with often tense neighbour, Romania.273 It seems that Voronin was afraid of Russia’s new 
policy towards ex-Soviet states and wanted to bandwagon NATO, Romania being a gate for closer 
relations with NATO.274 
 
But one can never count on Moldovan attitude. In the eve of the Parliamentary elections on the 5th 
of April 2009, several Romanian citizens have been negated access to Moldova in most of the cases 
without any explanation.275 It seems that Voronin is afraid that Romanians would want to join 
opposition forces and try to persuade Moldovans not to vote for the Communist Party.276 
 
Moldova needs Romania’s support in the process of joining the European Union, as well as for 
solving a number of economic problems. There have been some fears that Romanian accession to 
the EU would have a negative impact on the foreign trade of Moldova, since trade is now 
governed by EU regulations.277 But this has not happened. On the contrary trade with Romania 
has increased. According to the Moldovan National Statistics Bureau (BNS), Romania is one of the 
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main external economic partners and ranks second in terms of imports from Moldova (Table 5) 
and third in terms of exports to Moldova.278  
 
Romania’s membership of the EU is certainly a strategic advantage for Moldova. The identity of 
languages and the fact that Romania has already translated the whole bulk of the acquis 
communautaire would essentially facilitate the period for the community law implementation. 
Romania would also be a great partner in providing technical assistance and advisory services to 
Moldova in the accession process. Romania is playing a critical role in the emerging regional 
architecture of security and stability of the ECE279, therefore, Moldova’s place and relevance would 
be a very good argument in shortening the road towards the EU.280 But this implies a significant 
and strategic reconsideration of the Moldovan-Romanian relations which Moldova has to consider.  
 
5.2.1 Summary of Moldova-Romania relations 
The Moldovan-Romanian relationship has been one of a cost-benefit nature. In the 1990's Moldova 
felt it had a relatively high security, as it was protected by Russia and as such they could allow 
themselves to show a more aggressive attitude towards Romania. Nevertheless, Moldova changed 
its attitude as they did not get the expected response from Russia and the relative security was 
getting lower. In the 2000's Moldova began a soft bandwagoning of Romania, realising that they 
could benefit from a change in trade towards the EU. From the theoretical point of view, Romania 
has an influence on Moldova because it is in the near environment and because Romania now is a 
part of the Euro-Atlantic unipole. Furthermore, each time Russia used negative sanctions, 
Moldova’s relations with Romania drilled. 
  
According to our theory, although Moldova is an outsider, the EU can still exert a big influence on 
the free movement of Moldovans. The EU has the possibility to punish Moldova through economic 
sanctions if Moldova does not comply with EU rules. As an EU member, Romania is one of 
Moldova’s main trade partners and Moldova cannot afford to lose her. As Russia is a very unstable 
partner, all the time threatening with power exertion, Moldova needs to find alternatives, the best 
being a good relation with the EU countries and especially with Romania. 
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5.3 Moldova-Ukraine relations 
Ukraine is an important neighbour for Moldova as Ukraine has the capacity to play a central role 
in maintaining stability in the region. Moldova has a direct border with only two states, Ukraine 
and Romania. As such the relationship between the two countries is expected to be influenced by 
their common border, not the least the one in Transnistria. Besides, Ukraine’s common border with 
Transnistria means that Ukraine has an interest in finding a resolution to the conflict in the de facto 
state. Furthermore, the historical legacy is strong, as a large Ukrainian minority lives in Moldova 
and a large Moldovan minority in Ukraine. Last but not least, Ukraine is expected to play also an 
important role in Moldova’s aspirations towards the EU and NATO membership.  
 
Moldova's relationship with Ukraine is, just as the one with Russia and Romania, a complicated 
one. Historically, areas that were traditionally part of the region of Moldova or Romania281, and 
that continue to be inhabited in part by ethnic Romanians/Moldovans, were annexed by Ukraine 
when the Moldovan SSR282 was formed. The potential claims on these territories created tension 
between the two neighbours in the early years of Moldova's independence, when the Popular 
Front made public demands for restitution.283  
 
Another potential problem is the presence of a large ethnic Ukrainian minority in Moldova. Ethnic 
Ukrainians have sided with the local ethnic Russians in the dispute over Moldova's language law, 
and many ethnic Ukrainians have supported the separatist effort in Transnistria. However, the 
government of Moldova took significant measures to meet the demands of the Ukrainian minority 
for cultural autonomy and appears to have met with substantial success in defusing opposition to 
Moldova's Language Law.284  
 
As in the case of the Moldovan-Russian relation, the Moldovan-Ukrainian one was influenced 
substantially by the Transnistrian conflict. Given their own dispute with Russia concerning the 
status of Crimea, Ukrainians had little interest in supporting the presence of Russian military units 
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at its western frontier.285 However, as far as the process of political settlement of the Transnistrian 
conflict is concerned, Ukraine has had a controversial and unsteady stance. In the first years of the 
conflict, because of its separatist movements in Crimea, Ukraine had a very weak position and 
accepted totally the scenario imposed by Moscow authorities in dealing with the breakaway 
region.286 By the mid 1990s, once the stability came to Crimea and to Ukrainian-Russian 
relationship under president Kuchma, Kiev started a more active and independent policy and 
proposed its own scenario of settlement known as the “step by step” solution. De facto, that meant 
a gradual recognition of the separatist administration without a guarantee that a compromise 
would be reached.287   
 
Furthermore, each time Chisinau moved closer to Moscow, Kiev started to support the separatist 
leaders. Also, the position of the Tiraspol’ administration got closer to Kiev, every time the 
Ukrainian authorities proposed a solution to the dispute. Boris Tarasiuk, ex-Foreign Minister of 
Ukraine, recognized that the Ukrainian authorities before Yuschenko became president, 
“established a contraband chain” and de facto covered the contraband through Transnistria.288 
With no effective capabilities of the Moldovan state to defend its sovereignty, mercenaries from 
Russia and Ukraine289 were able to build up a powerful military springboard on the Transnistrian 
territory. The separatist enclave continues to rely heavily on various groups of politicians and 
oligarchs in both Ukraine and Russia, rising huge profits that come from drugs and human 
trafficking, arms-smuggling from the ex-USSR military hardware depots290. 
This situation has somewhat changed after Yushchenko became president. Ukraine’s attitude took 
a new turn after the Orange Revolution in December 2004, as it moved closer to the West. Kiev 
presented its own plan for the settlement of the conflict in April 2005, known as “The Yushchenko 
Plan”, while advocating for the inclusion of the USA and the EU in the negotiation mechanism. 
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Ukraine went even further, and in December 2005 concluded the border agreement with Moldova 
that has been strongly condemned by both Moscow and Tiraspol.291 
The Yushchenko Plan’s purpose was to create Transnistrian autonomy within Moldova. However 
the plan had many flaws. First of all, it failed to call for the withdrawal of Russian troops, ignoring 
their presence altogether. Secondly, it stipulated OSCE-supervised “democratic” elections in 
Transnistria in October 2005, despite the obvious absence of conditions for such elections there. 
Last but not least, it would empower Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE, “possibly assisted by” the 
USA and the EU, to arbitrate disputes over interpretation/implementation of Moldova-
Transnistria power-sharing arrangements - a system clearly weighted in Russia’s favour, and in no 
way balanced by the codicil on “possible assistance.”292 
On the 9th of June 2005 Moldova’s Parliament diplomatically stated that while it “highly 
appreciated Ukraine’s offer, they clearly did not embrace the main tenets of the Plan”, stating that 
it was in full support of future elections in Transnistria but at the exchange of the withdrawal of 
Russian troops from Transnistria by the end of 2005.293 The major shortcoming of the Yushchenko 
Plan was the lack of coordination of its initiatives with its Western allies and the short time table 
for implementing the plan.294 
In many ways, the Moldovan-Ukrainian relationship has been influenced by each country’s 
individual relationship with the great power Russia. Each time Russia has projected its power in a 
negative way the two countries have come closer to each other and have cooperated in getting EU 
support. 
Such an example is the control of borders that plays a significant role in sustaining the 
Transnistrian regime. The European Union Border Assistance Mission was established on 
November 30, 2005 at the request of Moldovan and Ukrainian governments for assistance in 
creation of an ‘international customs control arrangement and an effective border monitoring 
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mechanism on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine State border’.295 The objectives 
of the mission are to assist with the harmonisation of border management in line with the EU and 
more specifically “to help prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud, by providing advice 
and training to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs 
services”.296 
The mission is significant because it indirectly addresses the conflict by re-establishing Moldovan 
legal primacy over the whole of its territory — at least in the economic/business sector. And while 
the focus is clearly on the areas surrounding Transnistria, the additional benefit stems from 
increased Ukraine-Moldova co-operation and training by the EU.297 
This spirit of Ukrainian support for the Moldovan authorities continued in the first half of 2006. 
While visiting Chisinau in June 2006, the Ukrainian foreign minister stated that restoring 
Moldova’s territorial integrity and sovereignty is one of his country’ s foreign policy main tasks.298 
Kiev’s position was no longer as vocal after the Yanukovich government took power, and rumours 
about illegal trafficking to and from Transnistria have once again begun to spread. Nevertheless, 
the EU Border Assistance Mission remains in place, and its mandate has been extended up to 
November 2009.299 
With a recent history dominated by government instability, Ukraine remains a key factor to the 
settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. However, this lack of stability prevents her from also being 
an actor in this game. The present government has again had to deal with issues related to Russian 
gas deliveries and will also have to deal with other bilateral challenges that will render 
Transnistria a marginal topic of discussion for Kiev.300 
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Ukraine has also an important role in Moldova’s aspirations to the European integration. Ukraine’s 
rapprochement with the EU can generate not only more significant advantages for Moldova, but 
also serious threats and challenges. First of all, the progress of Ukraine in European integration 
could have synergetic effects on the other states in the region, particularly on Moldova. One of the 
objectives of the European Neighbourhood Programme is, besides deepening the relationship with 
Ukraine, to contribute to the gradual integration of other Eastern European States into the 
European zone.301 At the moment, Brussels intends to extend the Ukrainian model of creating the 
Free Trade Zone with the EU to the other Eastern European states. Consequently, the same 
principle could be applied in the case of Moldova.302 
 
Nevertheless, the progress of Ukraine can also have some negative effects on Moldova. If the 
economic relations with the EU will deepen, then the Ukrainian economy will have to adjust to the 
European quality standards and overtake some of Moldova’s EU markets. Another negative effect 
could be caused by preparation for accession/bilateral negotiations with the EU in the same 
format with Ukraine. This might be rather unfavourable to Moldova, as the process will last much 
longer. Ukraine is a large country, in which there are many diverging groups which may oppose 
further EU integration of Ukraine.303 
 
Last but not least, Ukraine is one of the primary foreign economic partners of Moldova. Ukraine 
occupies the third place in Moldovan export, with its share in 2007 of 167, 8 million more than 50%  
compared with 2006,  and the lead source of imported goods with deliveries amounting to 687 
million,  32% more than in 2006.304  
 
5.3.1 Summary of Moldova-Ukraine relations 
The Moldovan-Ukrainian relationship has been determined by their geopolitical environment 
which is both dominated by Russia and the EU and as such a balance of power attitude has taken 
place. Each time Russia has sanctioned Ukraine with negative incentives its relationship with 
Moldova has been cold. On the other side, cooperation has dominated when the EU has used 
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positive incentives. This is somehow in contrast to what the constellation theory predicts. 
According to the constellation theory, the relation between two outsiders should be rather immune 
to Euro-Atlantic stability projection.305 But it is not the case of Moldova and Ukraine on which 
particularly EU power projection has determined their pro-European orientation.   
 
 
 
5.4 Concluding remarks for the near geopolitical level 
The near geopolitical context has proved to have a major influence on the foreign development of 
Moldova with its relational polarity having Russia as the main actor and Romania and Ukraine as 
major pole attractions. Moldova is dependent on all three of them for different reasons but trade 
and the solution of the Transnistrian conflict are common for them all.  
 
Moldova's foreign policy shows an element of continuity among the various "post-communist" 
administrations, in that it is balanced and pragmatic in pursuit of its national interest, seeking 
equilibrium between its East and West interests, given its geographical location.306 Geopolitics has 
been an important determinant of foreign policy under Voronin, just as it was in the previous 
regimes.  
 
Moldova seems to have been more influenced by EU power projection than the constellation 
theory predicts. The Euro-Atlantic unipole constitutes an organisational superstructure that all 
outsiders have to relate to and although Russia has had a determining role in what happens in the 
region, the Euro-Atlantic unipole has not been as invisible as the theory predicts. Mouritzen and 
Wivel claim that “Euro-Atlantic stability projection has not had the slightest effect on the 
Transnistrian conflict”.307 That is not true. As it has been shown in the Russian-Moldovan relations, 
there have been instances where the Euro-Atlantic unipole has intervened with success. This 
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discrepancy is probably due to the fact that Mouritzen and Wivel only look at events that 
happened before 2001 and right after. In the mean time the situation has changed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. The domestic level 
The chapter will be structured after Buzan’s theory of the state and it will be dealt with three 
variables which are the idea of the state, the institutions of the state and the physical base of the 
state. The idea of the state comes from two main sources - a nation and its organising ideologies. It 
is expected that Moldova’s split identity between the Soviet and the Romanian roots will play an 
important role. Furthermore, communism was a very strong ideology during the Soviet Union and 
it still is in many ways especially since the Communist party has taken power. The institutional 
expression of the state comprises the entire apparatus of the government, including its executive, 
legislative and judicial institutions. The institutions of the state are very close connected to the 
organising ideologies. The focus will be on the ruling government and the Communist majority 
and it will be looked at in relation to the opposition parties. Other institutions will be touched 
upon in order to show the weakness of these and the authoritarian grip on power. The physical 
base of the state comprises its population and territory, including all of the natural resources and 
man-made wealth.308 The lack of natural resources and the existence of almost all heavy industry 
in Transnistria together with weak military capabilities will be emphasised. The shadow of the 
past will be incorporated in the analysis, where relevant. 
 
6.1. The idea of the state 
The kind of nation and the idea of a national identity will be emphasized as having explanatory 
power for how Moldova behaves. National identity has the power to either reinforce or undermine 
the state. Moldova can be seen as a multination-state, according to Buzan, as it comprises two or 
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 76
more complete nations within its boundaries.309 Nationality issues pose a constant source of 
instability. Lacking a natural unifying principle, Moldova has, since the independence of the 
country, been threatened by dismemberment, separatism and political interference. Thus, a weak 
idea of the state together with changing ideologies, such as democracy and communism, have 
created a fragile political foundation which is expected to reflect in the altering external behaviour. 
Ideologies are connected with the historical legacy or path dependency and they have been used in 
the Moldovan domestic politics to make analogies to past communist legacy.310 As the idea of the 
state and the institutions are close connected, it can create confusion. That’s why I have decided 
only to look at the national identity and the kind of nation under this section, while ideologies will 
be analysed in relation to the state’s institutional structures. 
 
Moldova’s history of shifting borders and political alliances has long been “reflected in the 
overlapping situational identities of [its] Bessarabia[n] inhabitants,”311 including their descendants 
in present day Moldova. It is due to these complex shifts in borders and political allegiances that it 
is difficult for modern Moldovans to look back towards a sole political identity. As King argues, 
“There is little in history to which the Moldovans can stake a unique propriety claim. Moldova’s 
most prominent historical figures are also those of the Romanians, and the territory of the present-
day Republic has not existed within a truly independent Moldovan state since 1525.”312 
 
In order to understand modern Moldovan identity, it is important to examine Moldova’s 
contemporary history. Following the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-12 and the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Bucharest, the Moldovan area between the Prut and the Nistru (Dniester) Rivers (known 
as Bessarabia) was annexed by Russia in 1812. Russia began a policy of assimilation of the local 
population, and from 86 percent at the time of incorporation, the Moldovans were reduced by 
almost 40 percent and only made up 14 percent of the urban population.313 In early 1918 Romanian 
troops crossed the Prut River and occupied Bessarabia under the pretext of restoring order along 
its borders after the fall of the tsar.314 Faced with a choice between Moscow and Bucharest, the 
Bessarabian National Assembly voted for union with the Kingdom of Romania in March 1918 and 
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in December joined several former Austro-Hungarian territories inside the newly enlarged borders 
of greater Romania.  
 
The integration of the Romanian-speaking population of Bessarabia raised problems far more 
difficult than those encountered in other regions. The population was overwhelmingly rural, 
mostly illiterate and not very mobile. The transition from the Tsarist-type of local government to 
the Romanian-type of centralized modern state with a corrupt administration alienated the 
Bessarabians, many of whom felt that they were rather occupied by their alleged brothers than 
united with them.315 Furthermore, Bessarabia had missed the previous unification of the Romanian 
regions into the first Romanian state, as they were already under Russian occupation, and thus had 
not such strong feelings of being Romanian as the rest of the Romanian provinces. The Romanian-
speaking population of Bessarabia continued to consider itself as Moldovan.316 
 
In 1924, Soviet authorities created the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) 
by combining Transnistria with territory in present-day Ukraine. The MASSR served as a 
propaganda vehicle and base for Soviet activities in Romanian-controlled Bessarabia.317 In 1939, 
Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which included secret 
protocols that conceded the Soviet Union Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. The Soviet Socialist 
Republic of Moldova was formed by joining Bessarabia with six counties that had constituted the 
MASSR.318 Due to the Soviet immigration policy, the percentage of ethnic Russians in Moldova 
almost doubled from 6.7 percent in 1941 to 13 percent by 1989, being the highest growth of ethnic 
Russians in a Soviet republic.319 As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians enjoyed 
disproportionate representation in important political and economic institutions. One major 
outcome of the Soviet industrialisation was that skilled industrial and technical jobs were often 
created in such a way that they could not be filled by natives, inducing a continuous net inflow of 
Russian speakers into Soviet Moldova.320  
 
                                                 
315 Hitchins, Keith (1996): Romania 1866-1947, Bucharest: Humanitas, pp.298-300, 363-379.  
316 Petrescu, Cristina (2005): ”Contrasting/Conflicting Identities: Bessarabians, Romanians, Moldovans” in Nationa-
building and contested identities: Romanian and Hungarian case studies, Iasi: Polirom, accessed 17.12, 2008 at 
http://dacoromania.org, pp. 2-3. 
317 Villarroel (2005): pp. 15-16. 
318 Constantiniu (1997): pp. 425-428. 
319 Munteanu, Igor (1999):  p. 7.  
320 Munteanu (1999):pp. 7-10. 
 78
Throughout this period, the Soviet leadership encouraged the creation of a distinct Moldovan 
nation in order to emphasize close cultural ties to Russia. The local leaders began creating a 
distinct Moldovan language in order to reinforce the idea of two separate nations. As part of the 
Russification policy, the alphabet for the Romanian language in Moldova was changed back to 
Cyrillic in 1939, and Russian once again became the language of interethnic communication, 
higher education, and public life.321 
 
As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s 
provided an opportunity for the Moldovan titular majority to express its desire for greater cultural 
freedoms and its resentment over Russification policies.322 In the beginning, the reform movement 
was not organized primarily around the issue of identity or ethnicity, as several ethnic groups had 
joined the Moldovans to express their claims. Rather, the division in the society was between 
established political elites and those who aspired to power in order to pursue a pro-reform 
agenda.323 
 
In August 1989, the Moldovan Supreme Soviet proclaimed Moldovan, using the Latin alphabet, as 
the state language. At the same time, the Popular Front emerged as a nationalist movement which 
had a more pro-Romanian agenda. With the adoption of the language law, fault lines began to 
develop within the Moldovan national movement. For many ethnic Moldovan intellectuals, the 
adoption of the language law represented a historical affirmation of the “true identity” of 
Moldova’s ethnic majority.324 This shift in focus and the exclusive elevation of the Moldovan 
language created an immediate response from the Russian-speaking community who connected 
the adoption of the language law with the union with Romania. The promotion of the Moldovan 
language threatened elites, especially in Transnistria. Ethnic Gagauzians, Ukrainians and 
Bulgarians united with ethnic Russians to form the International Movement for Unity. Factory 
strikes and demonstrations against the language law were organised. As King argues, 
Transnistrians were the group most opposed to the changes because it was a clear sign of the 
shifting balance of political power from Russian-speakers to Romanian-speakers.325  
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Despite the widely predicted union with Romania, this was not materialised. The emerging ex-
Soviet Moldova was more inclined to forge its own identity as an independent state.326 The first 
president, Mircea Snegur, realised that the only way to hold together the many ethnic minorities in 
Moldova, was by emphasizing the “Moldovan” national identity and the Moldovan language as 
separated from the Romanian one, in this way portraying himself and his government as the 
guarantors of Moldovan independence and territorial integrity.327  
Surveys carried out by William Crowther have shown that less than 10 percent of the ethnic 
Moldovan population supported union with Romania in the short or long term and, when given a 
choice between the ethnic tags “Romanian” and “Moldovan”, some 87 percent of 
Moldovan/Romanian-language speakers chose the latter.328 This can be seen as a consequence of 
the analogy the Moldovans made with the period between the two world wars when they were a 
part of Romania and felt very alienated from the rest of the population.  
 
Although there still is a pan-Romanian bloc supported by the small creative intelligentsia, most of 
Moldovans support an independent state and a special “Moldovan identity”. The successive 
governments have been commended by international observers for creating a civic, inclusive state 
rather than the ethnically defined nation-states favoured by the country’s neighbours.329 The 
multiethnicity of Moldova is even emphasized in the country’s foreign policy concept from 1995.330  
The ethnical groups of Moldova can be seen in the figure below. 
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Figure 3: Ethnical groups in Moldova331 
 
Thus, in accordance with the constellation theory, the past hegemon has important consequences 
for non-pole powers. However, in contrast to the constellation theory, I believe the shadow of the 
past is no less important than present-day political realities in determining, how Moldova will 
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redefine its domestic and external identity.332 What is important in the context of Moldova is that 
the past hegemon, Russia, still has a major influence on the country because of Russia’s 
geopolitical interests in the region. Negative historical experiences, such as the Russian/Soviet 
authoritarian rule are still reflected in the attitude of the successor, Russia. Moldova is a direct 
descendent of Soviet Union and as such, there have been many dependency elements that have 
contributed to the incapability of Moldova to come out of Russia’s sphere of influence.333 Many 
Central and East European states have had the possibility to balance Russia with the EU and 
NATO because Russia’s power projection has been weaker in relation to these countries. 
 
6.1.1 Summary of the idea of the state 
In many ways the tension between state and nation is for Moldova the weakest and most 
vulnerable link. According to our theoretical assumptions, unless the idea of the state is firmly 
planted in the minds of the population, the state as a whole has no secure foundation. Equally, 
unless the idea of the state is firmly planted in the “minds” of other states, the state has no secure 
environment and no foreign manoeuvre space.334 Moldova fits very well this description. The split 
Moldovan identity has been undermining the state, making it vulnerable to separatism and to 
external interference in domestic politics. The multiethnicity of Moldova has impeded the 
successive governments to have a clear orientation towards East or West.  
 
The analogy of the language law with the union of Moldova with Romania made the Russian-
speaking minorities revolt and the Transnistrian conflict erupt. Furthermore, the incompetent and 
arrogant treatment of the Romanian authorities between the two World Wars and immediately 
after independence, made many Moldovans wish independence and a separate “Moldovan” 
identity from the Romanian one. This confirms the theoretical expectations that past analogies help 
decision makers shape their policies.335  
 
6.2. The institutions of the state  
According to Buzan, “the institutions of the state comprise the entire machinery of government, 
including its executive, administrative and judicial bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by 
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which they operate”.336 As argued in the previous section, the idea of the state in Moldova is weak. 
In many ways, the institutions of the state can compensate for weaknesses in the idea of the state. I 
will focus mostly on the government’s role as an institution which has changed since the 
Communists came to power, having gained more and more power transforming itself into an 
authoritarian regime. The government will be seen in comparison to the institution of the 
Parliament where the relation between the Communist majority and the opposition parties plays a 
significant role. Other institutions will also be looked upon, the purpose being to show the 
weakness and corruption that are connected with the Moldovan institutions. 
 
As Buzan argues, organising ideologies are very close related to the machinery of the government 
as it is the government that implements them.337 Throughout the 1990s, the Moldovan political 
scene was very volatile with parties splitting in many different fractions and frequent government 
changing. (Figure 4) There were no clear ideologies, the closest to an ideological dividing line 
being the identity question.338  
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In this period, Moldovan leaders were caught between a Romanian-leaning nationalist movement 
on one side and pro-Russian forces on the other. In the early 1990s, for example, pro-Romanian 
nationalists refused to support Snegur’s efforts to concentrate presidential authority because of his 
opposition to Romanian unification. President Lucinschi339 faced also strong opposition from both 
nationalists and pro-Russian communists. In response to Lucinschi’s efforts to increase 
presidential power, these disparate groupings combined to transform Moldova into a 
parliamentary system.340 
 
Nonetheless, the emergence of a highly organised and cohesive Communist Party (PCRM) led to 
notable regime closure despite the establishment of a parliamentary regime. The overwhelming 
victory of PCRM in the 2001 Parliamentary elections with 51, 7 percent of the votes, was due to 
several factors.341 Collapse of the Moldovan economy and continual infighting among the parties 
and leaders associated with the government, led to support for alternatives in the personification 
of the Communists. They attracted mostly older people who were badly placed to withstand the 
transition and nostalgic for the previous regime. The Russian-speaking population gave them their 
unconditioned support. Finally, PCRM was able to maintain a greater level of organisational 
cohesion than its competitors.342 The Voronin administration used its dominance and cohesiveness 
to gain virtually unilateral control over state media and the judiciary, both of which had 
maintained autonomy in the 1990s by playing off competing political parties against one 
another.343 
 
There was consistent evidence of repeated pressure on the free media, with closures of critical 
journals and intimidation against critical journalists in the state-run television and radio company. 
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344 Promises for reforms were made but they have been repeatedly postponed. In the judiciary 
sphere, Voronin increased his powers of appointment over new judges. Furthermore, he dismissed 
the human rights ombudsman and attempted to limit the powers of the Constitutional Court.345 
The role of the state in the economy continues to be substantial, and therefore maintaining good 
relations with leading politicians, remains critical to carrying on high level business activities.346  
 
The triumph of the Party of Moldovan Communists underscores the need to realize the importance 
of the relationship between the historical and cultural context of a country, especially the "legacies 
of the past" approach.347 An example of the influence of path dependency on Moldova occurred at 
the Fourth Congress of the Party of Moldovan Communists in April 2002, when President Voronin 
talked about the "rebirth of socialism" and the historic mission of the Communist Party of 
Moldova, the only country in Europe that returned the Communists to power.348 This is in 
accordance with Khong who argues that policy makers form their analogies leaning on their 
personal experiences and most of all on the impact of major historical events. Voronin used the 
1990s political chaos and the “old good times” in order to get elected.349 
 
As Khong emphasizes, most policy makers have such trust in their analogies that they use them 
even when defects have been pointed to them. Some of the most controversial propositions 
Voronin had, was the amending of the constitution to declare Moldovan as the state’s official 
language so that Russian de facto became Moldova’s second official language, thus making the 
study of Russian obligatory in all schools as well as replacing the study of the History of the 
Romanians with that of the History of Moldova.350 These reforms were highly controversial largely 
                                                 
344 The government’s control over the electronic media was particularly evident in local elections of 2003, when state-
run media was openly biased in favour of PCRM candidates, violating the electoral code. See March (2005): p. 16.  
345 Freedom House (2006): Nations in Transit 2006: Moldova, accessed 20.03.09 at 
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/pdfdocs/moldova2006.pdf  
346 Soimaru, Vasile (26.03.2009): Guvernarea comunista – mare spalatoare de bani publici (Communist Government – 
big public money laundry) , Timpul,  accessed 27.03.09 at http://www.timpul.md/article/2009/03/26/guvernarea-
comunist%C4%83-mare-sp%C4%83l%C4%83toare-de-bani-publici  
347 The historical legacy or path dependency of a country's past has an important effect on the foreign policy behaviour 
of a state. Mouritzen & Wivel (2005): pp. 38-39. 
348 Conant, Eve (07.05.2001): “Moldova's Red Revival. A Miserable Former Soviet Republic Decides That Maybe The 
Old Days Weren't As Bad As It Thought They Were”, Newsweek, accessed 13.12.08 at: 
http://www.newsweek.com/id/79301/page/1  
349 Khong (2002): pp. 32-33. 
350 March (2005): p. 15. 
 85
due to the unresolved question of Moldova’s national identity and because they were seen as 
central gains of the national independence movement.351  
 
Under the leadership of the pro-Romanian and pro-Western Christian Democratic People's Party 
(CDPP) and its leader, Iurie Rosca, rallies were held almost daily in Parliament Square in the 
centre of Chisinau from January 9 to April 29, 2002. The government tried to oppress the 
demonstrations by suspending the CDPP for one month and lifting the parliamentary immunity of 
Rosca. Further pressures came from journalists which threatened to go on strike because of the 
widespread censorship. The growing domestic opposition and pressure from the EU and the 
Council of Europe which could lead to diplomatic isolation, made the government agree on a 
compromise solution proposed by PACE.352 
 
By mid-2002 the Moldovan Communists recognized the constraints of their own economic 
vulnerability created by 75 million dollars of Eurobond debt. With conditional support from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, Moldova was able to negotiate debt 
restructuring with its main Western creditors, in this way avoiding a financial disaster and 
managing to stave up its foreign exchange position.353 
 
Consequently, the economy began to improve, growing by 6.2 percent in 2001 and approximately 
7 percent in 2002.354 The PCRM benefited both from the economic upturn and from the 
improvement in governance which resulted from its control over both parliament and the 
presidency. Support for the Communists increased following the improvement of the public 
perception of conditions. Most striking was the support from the ethnic Moldovans, which 
increased from 23.5 percent in early 2001 to 47.7 percent in April of the following year. One 
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additional reason for this increase in Moldovan support was the repaying of pension arrears in this 
way reversing the drop in living standards in Moldovan villages that were populated by a 
majority of ethnic Moldovans.355  
 
At the parliamentary elections in 2005, Voronin and his party gained 56 seats which were enough 
for the Communists to govern but they needed 62 for electing the president. In order to re-elect 
Voronin the Communists needed 6 seats which they got by striking a deal with some of the 
opposition parties. The Communists’ success in these elections was first of all due to the steady 
increase in the economy but also to the recognition of the electoral salience of the “European 
issue”.  
 
Having cut relations with Russia, Voronin adopted a new strategy in dealing with Russian 
manipulation by emphasizing the protection of the Moldovan national interests. The Moldovan 
government, in response to the possibility of a Russian threat, expelled a number of Russian 
citizens accused of interfering in the election process. Predictably, the Russian State Duma 
responded by calling for imposition of economic sanctions.356 This triggered reactions from 
important Western circles which mediated a consensus between Voronin and a part of the 
opposition in order to re-elect Voronin as president. Rosca, which came under intense domestic 
criticism for his support of the Communists, argued that he had acted after advising with foreign 
supporters of democracy, including the Presidents of Ukraine and Georgia, and with the intent of 
supporting Voronin’s opposition to Moscow.357 
 
The strategic shift undertaken by the PCRM in the context of the 2005 elections reshaped 
Moldova’s political environment. By moving away from Moscow and committing itself to a pro-
European course, the PCRM consolidated its base of popular support. Much of the agenda agreed 
upon before the presidential vote was enacted in the course of 2005. Relations with both Romania 
and Ukraine warmed and the EU emerged as the central priority of the government.358  
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This redirection was, tactically, immanent for keeping the support, as the proportion of 
Russophones in the Moldovan population was decreasing. Any loss of enthusiasm among the 
Russian minority was counterbalanced by increased support from Moldovans.359 The opposition 
parties and leaders were in the words of Crowther “de-legitimated” because Voronin “stole” the 
EU orientation, which was the leading issue of the opposition. Divided among themselves, 
associated with corruption, and compromised by the past political manoeuvring, none of the 
opposition leaders was well positioned to assume leadership of the country.360  
 
Nevertheless, recent events have determined a turn of the electorate away from the Communists. 
First of all, the Communists are in a dilemma: if they seek rapprochement with Europe, they will 
be required to enact more reforms and their popular support is likely to decrease.361 Besides, any 
open move towards Europe risks a renewed involvement from Russia either by economic 
punishment or by involvement in the parliamentary elections, which will be hold on April 5, 
2009.362 Thus, the Communists are torn. They want energy security with the help of Romania, a 
wealthier European future and to still be on good terms with the Kremlin. This indecisiveness has 
been reflected in the opinion polls conducted at the end of 2008. Up to half the total number of 
respondents said they had not yet decided who to vote for. PCRM can count on 23 to 30 percent of 
the vote, while three opposition parties are likely to gain the minimum 6 percent required to win 
parliamentary representation.363 
 
The opposition parties have been able to find capable people to run in the elections and this has, 
together with the Communists’ indecisiveness and the many mistakes the PCRM has done lately, 
led to the electorate moving away from the Communists. An increase in pro-Romanian voters has 
been felt recently. This was proven by the thousands of people who came to give the last honours 
to the most respected Moldovan poet Grigore Vieru364, a fighter for the union with Romania. It is, 
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though, hard to say whether the opposition has the capacity to win the elections, due to the split 
imposed by unfair law365, the denigration campaign launched by the Communists and the limited 
access to the media.366   
 
6.2.1 Summary of the institutions of the state  
According to our theory, the stability of the institutions of the state is important for the security of 
a state. Lack of support from the population and other internal issues can be a threat to the 
cohesion of the state in its external behaviour. In the case of Moldova, the weak idea of the state 
combined with weak institutions in the 1990s, created a weak governmental authority which 
showed split in the external orientation and led to the country being vulnerable to both internal 
and external threats, personified by the Transnistrian conflict and the Russian domination.  
 
Furthermore, Buzan argues that the weakness in the idea of the state can be compensated by 
strong institutions. The institutions are also very close connected to the ideologies of the state, 
since it is the institutions that put the organising ideologies into action. This can be confirmed for 
Moldova, as the change in government in 2001 has led to a more stable internal situation. The 
Communists’ strong ideology combined with their control of both the institutions of the state and 
the opposition has brought more welfare and consequently the support of the population. On the 
other side, it has also brought a decline in the democratic progress of Moldova. 
 
Last but not least, national and international politics interact and governments have the tendency 
to interfere in each other’s domestic politics. This is also the case of Moldova, where Russia has 
sanctioned Moldova and interfered in Moldovan politics, as soon as Moldova showed a wish to 
change its orientation towards Europe.  
 
6.3. The physical base of the state 
The physical base of the state comprises its population and territory, including all of the natural 
resources and man-made wealth contained within its borders.367 It is the most concrete component 
of the state and threats to physical objects are necessarily more direct and obvious than the ones to 
                                                 
365 Parties have to gain minimum 6 percent of votes in order to gains seats in the Parliament. 
366 Bogatu, Petru (11.02.2009): “The fellowship of the List”, Moldova Azi, accessed 19.02.09 at www.azi.md/en/print-
story/1308  
367 Buzan (1991): p. 90. 
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ideas and institutions. The territory’s seizure both by other states and by internal secessionist 
movements can affect the security and implicitly the foreign policy of a state. Some regions are 
more important than others because of resources, the cultural identity of occupants or other 
strategic or economic reasons.368 The Moldovan population living in Transnistria and the fact that 
most of the heavy industry lies in the separatist region, make this piece of land of very strategic 
and economic importance for Moldova. Furthermore, the lack of natural resources makes Moldova 
totally dependent on energy import from Russia. (Table 4)  
 
Another threat for a state is migration in or out of the territory. In Moldova, the most acute threat 
comes from the migration of most of the well educated people to the EU and Russia. The dispute 
over boundaries can also create a threat for the state and a foreign policy issue. In this case, 
disputes with Ukraine over the Transnistrian border are expected to be important.  
 
We could say that the physical base of Moldova, in many ways is very weak, both with concern to 
natural resources, man-made goods and population. I comment on each of these issues. Among 
the most pressing difficulties facing the republic's economy is a near total lack of energy resources. 
(Table 6) Moldova's own primary energy sources consist of small hydroelectric power plants on 
the Nistru River at Dubasari and Camenca (Kamenka, in Russian); minor thermal electric power 
plants at Balti, Rîbnita (Rybnitsa, in Russian), Ungheni (Ungeny, in Russian), and Chisinau; and 
firewood, all of which combine to meet only 1 percent of domestic needs.369  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
368 Buzan (1991): p. 92. 
369 Fedor (1995):  pp. 5-6. 
        Table 6: Energy and fuel balance of 
Moldova (thousand tonnes of coal equivalent) 
 2006 
Internal sources total 131 
Liquid fuel 10 
Solid fuel 112 
Hydroelectricity   9 
Import  3082 
Liquid fuel 862 
Solid fuel 150 
Gas  1716 
Electricity  354 
Export  6 
Internal consumption 3242 
 90
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another source of problems is the fact that almost 90 percent of power and 100 percent of power 
transformers are produced in politically troubled Transnistria. In addition, Transnistria's 
adversarial "government" has frequently disrupted the flow of fuels into Moldova from Russia and 
Ukraine. In 1994 Moldova was dependent on Russia for 90 percent of the fuel needed for its 
electric-power generation plants: diesel oil (88,000 tons), gasoline (65,000 tons), fuel oil (365,000 
tons), and natural gas (2.8 billion cubic meters). By March 1995, Moldova owed Russia US$232 
million for fuel, with half of this amount owed by Transnistria.370  
 
Next to Georgia, of the CIS countries Moldova pays the highest price for gas. (Table 3) In exchange 
for price rises spread out until 2011, Chisinau allowed Gazprom to take substantial parts of the 
Moldovan gas market. Moldova can be seen as a case study of Russia’s strategy for taking control 
of the energy sectors in ex-Soviet states. Russia’s main aim is to make these countries economically 
dependent and therefore allow Russia to gain important political influence.371 (Tables 7 & 8)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
370 Ibid.  
371 Gromadzki, Grzegorz & Wojciech Kononczuk (2007): Energy game. Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus between the EU 
and Russia, Warshaw: the Stefan Batory Foundation, pp. 25-26. 
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Baltic States in 2007 
Country Consumption  
billion m3 
Ukraine  64.6 
Belarus 19.4 
Kazakhstan 19.8 
Lithua ia 3.8 
Mo dova 2.4  
Armeni  2.05 
Georgia 1.49 
Latvia .0  
Estonia 1.003 
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In the 1990s, Gazprom managed to take over most of the shares in Moldovagaz, the most 
important energy company with a monopoly on the Moldovan gas network. Hence, Gazprom took 
control both of the transit gas pipeline transporting Russian gas to the Balkan countries and over 
virtually all of Moldova’s internal gas network. In 2006, Gazprom took also control of two 
combined heat plants and power lines along which electric energy can be exported to the Balkan 
countries. See Map over pipeline system.  So, Moldova is at the moment totally dependent on 
Russia for its energy. This has happened because Moldova was not able to pay even the low price 
for gas, which they had to pay in the 1990s, thereby incurring debts of hundreds of millions of 
dollars. Consequently, Moldova allowed Russian companies to take control of most of the energy 
system of the country in exchange for the debts.372  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
372 Ibid. p. 26. 
    Figure 5: Map over Ukraine’s pipeline system  
    Figure 4: Map over Ukraine’s pipeline system  
    Figure 4: Map over Ukraine’s pipeline syst m  
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In regard to the man-made goods, most of heavy industry lies in Transnistria. In early 1990s, 
Transnistria accounted for about 40 percent of Moldova’s GDP. It produced more than 35 percent 
of its total industrial output, including 90 percent of electricity, all steel, rolled metal, and heavy 
industrial equipment, as well as a large part of the food processing industry.373 This over-
industrialisation of Transnistria was a strategy from the Soviet leadership, which hoped, that by 
dividing the Soviet Republic of Moldova in two parts, heavy industry in Transnistria (which had 
been a part of USSR since 1918) and agriculture in Bessarabia, it could isolate the ethnic Moldovans 
and control the country through the Russian elites that were installed in all the political and 
economical key positions. The economic potential of the separatist republic has been used by the 
separatist leaders as the main argument in favour of Transnistria’s claim to statehood.374  
 
Furthermore, contraband and smuggling of weapons, alcohol, oil, drugs, pharmaceuticals, tobacco 
and other goods through Tiraspol-Odessa route and through Romanian ports, brings 
approximately US$ 2 billion a year to the Smirnov regime, helping sustain the authoritarian 
                                                 
373 Fedor (1995): p. 6. 
374 Ciobanu (2008): p. 94. 
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regime.375 Thus, one might say, that the main obstacle for finding a solution to the conflict is the 
economic interests of varying political elites. The Transnistrian “state” is run by the “president” 
and his sons and a few others who constitute the political elite, and they advance their own 
interests without showing any form of legitimate process. A parallel can be drawn to Moldova, 
where the President’s family is deeply embedded in the activities of the economic elite, the son of 
the President being one of the richest businessmen in Moldova. It is not clear how genuine the 
Moldovan President’s attempts to challenge Transnistrian smuggling have been. New customs 
stamps have been issued, with Transnistrians thereby losing their right to act as collectors of 
Moldovan Customs dues.376  
 
While Voronin and other Moldovan elites have advantages from the illegal business, Moldova’s 
economy will not improve if necessary measures to combat this trafficking are not taken. In this 
way, Voronin will both lose popular support and EU support as the issue of border security is a 
crucial one to the EU, who has pressured for tightening the Transnistrian border with Ukraine. As 
a result, the European Border Assistance Mission has been established in order to monitor the 
Transnistrian segment of the Moldova-Ukraine border.377 The mission establishes indirectly 
Moldovan primacy over the whole of its territory, at least in the economic sector, and it is 
beneficial for the cooperation with Ukraine and EU.378  
Another important issue is the migration one, as more than half a million Moldovans have 
Romanian passport, thereby being EU citizens and representing a demographic and economic 
problem for Moldova. Furthermore, migration to Russia is even higher. Many of the Moldovans 
working in the EU are illegal and this is an important factor for the Moldovan economy as about 
36% of Moldova’s GDP is formed from remittances (the highest ratio of remittances to GDP in the 
world).379 (Table 9)The negative effect from this outflow of labour is the distraught of socio-
                                                 
375 Vaux, Tony (2002): “Moldova and the Impact of Transnistria”, Independent  Report for DFID (Department for 
International Development), Oxfordshire: Humanitarian Initiatives, accessed 20.02.09 at 
http://upload.moldova.org/documents/Peace%20and%20Conflict%20Resolution/Moldova_and_impact_of_Transdniestr
ia.pdf , p. 17. 
376 Popescu (2005): pp. 17-20. 
377 The Council of the European Union (2007): p.  
378 Pajalic (2008): p. 60. 
379 Vaux (2002): pp. 17-18. 
       Table 9: Geographic origin a d amount of remittances in 2006  
Host Country Migrants % 
Am unt of remittances  
in million euro 
Russian Federation 41 181 
Italv 33 145 
Western Europe 14 62 
Turkey/Israel 4 18 
USA 3 13
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Russian Federation 41 181 
Italv 33 145 
Western Europe 14 62 
Turkey/Israel 4 18 
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economic infrastructure, further reduced competitive production and consolidated patterns of 
consumption based on the migrant remittances.380  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.1. Summary of the physical base of the state 
The physical base of the state is an important element in a government’s strategy concerning 
foreign matters. This is confirmed in the case of Moldova where the lack of resources and control 
of parts of its territory have proven to be two sources of great insecurities as Moldova is dependent 
on Russia both for energy supplies and for the solution of the conflict in Transnistria. Furthermore, 
the migration of most of the well educated people to the EU and Russia, the weak economy with 
most heavy industry in Transnistria, and the illegal trafficking from Transnistria through Moldova 
to EU countries, have determined changing policies of the government. We have seen both a 
Russian orientation constrained by the dependence on trade with Russia and the CIS countries, 
and a European orientation caused by the need of EU support in order to shift external trade to the 
EU countries. In this way, a combination of weak physical base and negative/positive incentives 
from the Euro-Atlantic unipole, respectively, the great power in the region, have determined 
Moldova’s foreign policy. 
 
                                                 
380 Munteanu (2008): p. 6. 
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6.4 Concluding remarks for the domestic level  
In this chapter I have argued that the domestic level is important in order to give a comprehensive 
picture of the foreign policy of a state. In order to do that, I have used Buzan’s theory of the state 
which comprises the idea of the state, the institutions of the state and the physical base of the state. 
This has been combined with the constellation theory’s emphasis on the shadow of the past. The 
weak idea of the state reflected in the split identity between the Romanian and the Russian roots 
has had an important effect on the government’s possibilities to infer controversial reforms and to 
act in the Transnistrian conflict. 
 
The invocation of a strong ideology such as communism to make analogies to the Soviet legacy has 
brought popular support. Voronin understood that popular support is important and he has 
changed strategies according to the change in public opinion, in this way not being necessarily 
faithful to the communist ideology he invoked at the beginning of its rule. 
 
The close relationship between domestic and international politics has been emphasized in the 
way that many of the decisions taken by the Voronin government, as in the case of the Kozak 
Memorandum, were a combination of internal and external pressures. 
 
The physical base of the country is also a determinant factor for Moldova’s foreign trade and 
orientation. Lack of resources, seizure of the territory by an internal secessionist movement, 
migration of its citizens to the EU and Russia and illegal trade have determined a hesitant and 
changing foreign policy between the great power, Russia, and the Euro-Atlantic unipole. 
 
Consequently, the domestic level has brought understanding concerning the role of the state in 
foreign policy, but it cannot stand alone. Only by examining the interaction between materialist 
and idealist factors at different levels can we get a better understanding of a country’s foreign 
policy. 
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7. Conclusion and perspectives for the future 
In this final chapter, the research question will be answered and the theoretical implications will be 
reflected upon. Subsequently, it will be looked at elements in the thesis that can be criticised and 
the possibilities for an analysis of Moldova’s foreign policy from a different viewpoint will be 
discussed. Finally, future perspectives for Moldovan foreign policy and reflections on the further 
development of the chosen theories will be touched upon. 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
The research question will be answered on the basis of the chosen theoretical framework, by 
looking at the influence of the Euro-Atlantic unipole, impersonated by the EU and NATO, the near 
geopolitical environment, represented by Russia, Romania and Ukraine and the domestic setting 
seen through analysis of the idea of the state, its institutions and its physical base. 
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The research question of this thesis is: how can we explain Moldova’s foreign and security policy 
after the Communists came to power in 2001? The answer is that Moldova, since independence in 
1991, has conducted a balanced and pragmatic foreign policy in pursuit of its national interest. 
Equilibrium between its East and West interests has been sought, given its geographical location 
between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic unipole. So, the question from the introduction if it is a 
surface change can be partly answered by yes. The Voronin government’s change towards 
Europeanisation is only surprising because there is a Communist government in power but it is 
not surprising if we look at the geopolitical past and present environment, including the behaviour 
of all administrations after 1991.  On the one hand, this rapprochement is due to the present 
geopolitical considerations, with a more favourable EU/NATO policy opposed to an aggressive 
Russian policy and the need for domestic support. On the other hand, past geopolitics with a 
history of Romanian/Russian (Soviet) occupation has importance for all the actors involved.  
 
The Euro-Atlantic level 
The relationship of Moldova with the EU and NATO has not been very close as Moldova in the 
1990s was more under the influence of Russia as the closest great power, while the EU and NATO 
did not show much interest in the little, almost forgotten republic. 
  
As an outsider to the EU, Moldova has experienced a relatively high autonomy, because the EU 
has a decentralised nature giving no definitive prescriptions for acceptable foreign policy 
behaviour. As such, Moldova’s behaviour has been very heterogeneous, both bandwagoning and 
balancing being used when appropriate. The positive attitude towards the EU has also been 
influenced by the behaviour of the past hegemon, Russia. When Russia has projected its power 
through negative incentives such as higher energy prices or ban on wine products, the EU has 
used positive incentives such as including Moldova in the ENP Programme and signing an Action 
Plan with it. In order to comply with more EU policy regulations, Moldova must see substantial 
advantages which cannot be seen at the moment.  
 
When it comes to NATO, Moldova has declared herself a neutral country and has stated in its 
constitution that no foreign armed troops are permitted on the territory of the country. Neutrality 
means that the cooperation with NATO is very weak. The lack of interest from NATO in the 
1990’s, Russia’s pressure to include Moldova in various security designs and a lack of military 
capabilities have determined this attitude.  
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Thus, Moldova is split between a European and a Russian orientation, the determining factor 
being the geopolitical advantages and up to now it has been difficult to see more advantages from 
the EU and NATO than from Russia. 
 
The near geopolitical level  
As expected, the geopolitical variable is the one with most explanatory power. In order to show 
that, I have looked at the relationship of Moldova with Russia, Romania and Ukraine.  
 
Russia has had the strongest influence on Moldova. As a general strategy, Moldova has chosen to 
bandwagon Russia due to the relative strong capabilities that Russia possesses in the region. 
Moldova is dependent on Russia for receiving energy, for exporting its products to the Russian 
market and not least for finding a solution to the Transnistrian conflict. From the analysis, we can 
see that Russia has not contributed to peace in the separatist conflict and it has threatened 
Moldova each time they have not complied with Russian interests. Such an attitude has, 
surprisingly, determined Moldova, after the Communist government of Voronin came to power in 
2001, to change strategy and begin to balance Russia with the EU. The EU has shown itself more 
active concerning the solution of the Transnistrian conflict and has allowed Moldova to enter the 
European trade markets. Still, Moldova has been inclined to be more sensitive to the power 
influence of the nearest power pole than the Euro-Atlantic unipole.  
 
The relationship to Romania has been very turbulent considering their problematic shared past 
and the split in the identity between the pro-Romanian and the pro-Russian population. 
Moldova’s strategy towards Romania has changed from balancing for most of the 1990’s to both 
bandwagoning and balancing in the 2000’s. Besides receiving a substantial aid from and being able 
to send students to study for free at Romanian universities, Romania is also one of Moldova’s main 
trade partners, which Moldova cannot afford to lose. Furthermore, Romania is the gateway to 
closer relations with the EU. 
 
Ukraine is an important partner for Moldova as it has the capacity to play a central role in 
maintaining stability in the region. The relationship between the two countries has been relatively 
peaceful, Moldova choosing to bandwagon Ukraine.  Ukraine is important regarding border 
security, especially the one with Transnistria. Concerning the solution of the conflict, Ukraine has 
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also been useful as it has an advantage in ending this conflict which threatens the borders of 
Ukraine. Furthermore, the country occupies the third place in Moldovan exports and has an 
important role in Moldovan energy security as energy from Russia is delivered through Ukrainian 
pipelines. Moreover, progress of Ukraine towards the EU and NATO accession can generate both 
positive and negative effects on Moldova. 
 
The domestic level  
The weak idea of the state reflected in the split identity between the Romanian and the Russian 
roots combined with weak institutions was a constant source of instability in the 1990s. Lacking a 
natural unifying principle, Moldova has, since independence, been threatened by dismemberment, 
separatism and political interference from Russia.  The multiethnic character of Moldova has also 
impeded the successive governments to have a clear orientation towards either East or West. 
 
The invocation of a strong ideology such as communism to make analogies to the Soviet legacy 
combined with a stable internal situation coming from strong authoritative institutions and control 
of the opposition has brought popular support to the Voronin government. Voronin has changed 
strategies according to the change in public opinion, in this way not being necessarily faithful to 
the communist ideology he invoked in the beginning of his rule. 
 
This thesis has also shown that one cannot always separate domestic from international politics 
and that governments have a tendency to interfere in each others domestic politics, in this case 
Russia being the most obvious example. Such interventions are the provision of funds and facilities 
to Transnistria or to the opposition parties, external economic pressures and others. Many of the 
decisions taken by the Voronin government as in the case of the Kozak Memorandum were a 
combination of internal and external pressures, this time from the Western actors. 
 
Physical factors like the lack of resources, seizure of the territory by an internal secessionist 
movement, migration of its citizens to the EU and Russia and illegal trade have determined a 
hesitant and changing foreign policy between the great power, Russia, and the Euro-Atlantic 
unipole. 
 
7.2 Reflections on the thesis 
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By choosing one theoretical model rather than another, there can be important factors that are not 
taken into consideration. A factor like the US policy towards Moldova has been neglected. One 
would expect USA to be an important actor in Central and Eastern Europe but the empirical 
evidence has shown that this is not the case for Moldova. Besides, the expectation that the 
environment around Moldova is multipolar, of the given reasons in the analysis, has showed to be 
well-founded. Moreover, analysing a single case means that the validity of the results is not 
necessarily universal, or can be applied to other case studies. The purpose of this thesis is not to 
generalise to other countries but to go into depth with the case in question.  However, this research 
might be useful in understanding general outcomes of similar cases, notably other ex-Soviet 
countries.  
 
The chosen theoretical model implies the combination of several levels of analysis. Not restraining 
to one level and adding more variables can be seen as leading to ad hoc analysis. I have tried to be 
consistent with my rationalistic method and the variables for analysis have been chosen from the 
perspective of the theoretical frame. Furthermore, it is not easy to discern the three levels from 
each other. The events analysed relate themselves to more than one level of analysis, in this way 
the analysing variables can influence each other, being difficult to discern the level of influence 
each variable has on foreign policy behaviour. The same can be said at the domestic level where 
the idea of the state and the institutions are inseparably intertwined. The meaning with this thesis 
is exactly to show that foreign policy cannot be explained by only looking at one level of analysis 
or by separately analysing our variables, as many elements play into each other to give a 
comprehensive picture of our subject. Thus, one might say that the geopolitics in the near 
environment have had most influence on Moldova, in the 1990s being the great power Russia and 
the CIS countries who were closest to Moldova. However, the closer Moldova has come to the EU, 
the more the EU has showed an interest in Moldova, the more EU has become a near geopolitical 
factor.  
 
The choice of theory can be criticised as some would say that Buzan’s theory is more constructivist, 
with the emphasis on ideas and identity, than realist. Nevertheless, the contemporary structural 
realist research programme includes analysis at the domestic level, as well as ideas. In a realist 
model, ideas and identity are tools that help decision-makers explain their realist decisions. As 
argued in this thesis, the spatio-temporal context is decisive for the behaviour of Moldova. Thus, 
constructivist and realist variables are important in different issue areas. As expected, the 
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importance of geopolitics stressed by realists is more important in security politics whereas the 
constructivist factors matter most in identity politics, providing important insights into how non-
poles value national autonomy in relation to influence vis-à-vis the EU/NATO and important pole 
powers in the region. 
 
From an empirical point of view, the thesis has taken its point of departure in electronic resources 
and books from both Moldovan and foreign experts. A research on the ground might have given a 
more nuanced picture of the actual situation in Moldova. Nevertheless, although much of the 
media in Moldova is controlled by the state, there are surprisingly many independent researchers 
and newspapers that give a rather comprehensive picture of Moldova.  
 
7.3 Perspectives for the future 
Moldova is at a place where few can question its vulnerability to changes in the geopolitical affairs 
surrounding the landlocked territory. It is necessary to understand how Moldova came to be 
where it is today in political terms, in order to fully define the roles of the EU, NATO and Russian 
policies towards Moldova and thus Moldova’s policy towards these international actors. Moldova 
is in a state of infancy when discussing political maturity meaning that if it is given the proper 
attention from the Western actors, the Moldovan leadership can only flourish. 
 
EU and NATO have to begin to cultivate Moldova’s aspirations before Moldova becomes tired of 
trying to amount attention from the West, at which point it could redirect its look to the East again. 
Russia has demonstrated through its recent actions in Moldova and in the region that Moldova 
continues to increase in priority. Moreover, due to Russia’s historical role within its periphery and 
the wish of Russia to regain control of this region, Moldova is in a place where Russia will not 
spare it attention. For the same geopolitical reasons Moldova is currently getting added attention 
from its Western neighbours. 
 
Moldovan society has changed and both civil society and the citizens have begun to put pressure 
on the government, and due to this, the government has also begun to take more into 
consideration the public support for their policies. The Moldovans need to realize that they are the 
ones that can bring about the life that they look for across its Western border. In the near future, 
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Moldova stands a great chance at achieving most of the goals that it has set for itself if it loses its 
fear of friction and begins to challenge the status quo. 
 
I have not designed the model of my analysis as a test of the theories used. As shown, many of the 
predictions of the constellation theory do concur with the empirical evidence but it has also been 
shown that in the case of Moldova past geopolitics is just as important as present geopolitics and 
the shadow of the past is present at all levels of analysis. Thereby, the constellation theory needs 
further development at the domestic level, a better explanation of the concept of “the shadow of 
the past” is required and adding more elements such as identity and ideas would give a more 
comprehensive picture of the internal situation.     
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